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Judicial Ideology and the Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence
Adam B. Cox†
Thomas J. Miles††
For two decades, the doctrinal test laid out in Thornburg v Gingles has been the
centerpiece of vote dilution litigation in the United States. Gingles defined a
sequential, two‐part framework combining a set of rule‐like preconditions to
liability with a standard‐like inquiry into the totality of the circumstances.
Despite this elaborate framework, emerging empirical work shows that politi‐
cal ideology connects closely with how judges have decided vote dilution
cases; Democratic appointees have proven much more likely than Republican
appointees to favor liability under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This
work raises the question of what role the Gingles framework really plays in
voting rights litigation. More basically, it raises the fundamental question of
whether legal doctrine actually constrains judicial decisionmaking. Using a
dataset of every Section 2 decision issued since Gingles, this Article explores
these twin puzzles. It finds substantial evidence that legal rules are indeed
more ideologically constraining than standards. Ideological divisions are much
more pronounced in the standard‐like second step of Gingles than under the
more rule‐like preconditions. Moreover, the Article shows that the doctrinal
dynamics of vote dilution litigation have changed dramatically over the past
two decades. As the representational and political implications of vote dilution
claims have shifted, the Gingles factors that both judges and scholars claim are
central to the liability inquiry have become far less important. Courts’ sharp
movement away from the centrality of the Gingles factors amounts to a largely
unrecognized second transformation of voting rights litigation.

† Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
†† Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. We are grateful to
Rosalind Dixon, Heather Gerken, Rick Hasen, Jonathan Masur, Adam Samaha, Cass Sunstein, Max
Schanzenbach, Josh Sellers, Emerson Tiller, Dan Tokaji, and Fred Vars for helpful comments and
conversations. We would also like to thank the workshop participants at Northwestern University
School of Law, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, Yale Law School, and the Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies for helpful comments. Carolyn Sha and Annabelle Yang provided invalu‐
able research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
The history of Voting Rights Act litigation is usually told as a tale of
formal jurisprudential change. The history divides voting rights litiga‐
tion into two periods separated by a sharp break—a break marked by
an amendment to the text of the statute and by the introduction of a
new doctrinal framework. The amendment occurred in 1982, when
Congress recast Section 2 of the Act as the central judicial tool for en‐
forcing minority voting rights.1 The Supreme Court responded to this
revision a few years later by forging a new doctrinal framework in the
seminal case of Thornburg v Gingles.2 This transformation by Congress
and the Court ushered in the modern era of vote dilution litigation.
Lawsuits brought under Section 2 became a centrally important
mechanism for the enforcement of minority voting rights. And the
framework laid down in Gingles became the linchpin in this litigation.3
This Article argues that the standard history is incomplete. The fo‐
cus on the formal features of voting rights doctrine, while important,
leaves out the actual practices of lower courts that decide voting rights
cases. Recently, evidence on how judges decide these cases has begun
to emerge. It shows that Democratic appointees were more likely than
Republican appointees to vote for liability under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, the primary private enforcement mechanism of the Act.
Moreover, a judge’s race had an even greater effect than partisanship
on the likelihood of favoring liability: minority judges voted more than
twice as often as white judges in favor of liability. For both partisanship
and race, “panel” or “peer effects” were strong. The average Democratic
appointee voted in favor of liability under Section 2 more often when
she sat with other Democratic, rather than Republican, appointees.
Similarly, the average white judge became substantially more likely to
vote in favor of liability when she sat with at least one minority judge.4
These findings, while important, do not account for the role of law
in voting rights cases. In this way, the emerging evidence is typical of
most modern empirical work on judicial politics. Studies of judicial de‐
cisionmaking typically link judicial ideology to ultimate case outcomes
without tracing the impact of ideology through the analytical frame‐
work of the applicable legal doctrine. For political scientists who ad‐
here to the more extreme versions of the attitudinal model, inattention
1
The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97‐205 § 3, 96 Stat 131, 134, codi‐
fied as amended at 42 USC § 1973 (2000).
2
478 US 30 (1986).
3
See text accompanying notes 31–36.
4
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L Rev 1, 18–49
(2008).
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to law is unsurprising. They believe that the pursuit of judicial policy
preferences fully explains judicial behavior; legal variables are irrele‐
vant. But for legal academics, empirical evidence on the relationship
between doctrinal structure and ideology should have paramount im‐
portance because it informs one of the central controversies (perhaps
the central controversy) of law: the age‐old debate over the choice be‐
tween rules and standards.
Debates about rules and standards almost inevitably begin with
the presumption that rules constrain judges more so than standards.
Judicial decisions seemingly provide a wealth of potential empirical
data about the strength of this presumption. But by sidestepping legal
doctrine almost entirely, studies of judicial behavior fail to capitalize on
this resource. Studies that consider whether rule‐like doctrines actually
exert a more constraining effect than standard‐like ones are remarka‐
bly rare. In view of the resurgent interest in empirical legal studies,5 the
omission of legal doctrine from statistical studies of judicial decision‐
making is particularly surprising.
This Article begins to remedy that omission by examining the doc‐
trinal framework that the Supreme Court created in Gingles for evaluat‐
ing claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Gingles laid
out a sequential, two‐part doctrinal framework that combines a set of
rule‐like preconditions to liability with a more standard‐like totality of
the circumstances inquiry. This unique doctrinal structure permits us
to undertake two sorts of inquiries.
The first inquiry is static: the two‐part structure of Gingles pro‐
vides a preliminary means of testing the relationship among rules,
standards, and ideological disagreement. The greater indeterminacy
and flexibility of standards implies that ideological differences between
judges would be more often observed in the application of a standard‐
like doctrine rather than of a rule‐like one.
The second inquiry focuses on the doctrinal dynamics of vote dilu‐
tion litigation over time. In the two decades since Gingles was decided,
vote dilution litigation has undergone a remarkable transformation.
Changes over time in the types of suits brought and the political reali‐
ties on the ground have altered the significance of treating the Gingles
preconditions as central proof of unlawful vote dilution. These move‐
ments have both undermined the close connection between the pre‐
conditions and minority representation and complicated the question
of whether Democrats or Republicans are likely to benefit from rigid

5
See generally Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev
831 (2008) (discussing the emergence of the New Legal Realism). [AP]
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application of the preconditions.6 These changes allow us to investigate
the way in which changes in the characteristics of litigated cases influ‐
ence the way in which judges apply judicial doctrines. They suggest, for
example, that both Democratic and Republican appointees may over
time rely less on the Gingles preconditions, but that reliance will drop
more sharply for Democratic appointees.
Using a data set of every decision issued in a Section 2 case since
Gingles, we examine the doctrinal route judges choose to follow when
either finding or rejecting liability under the Act. We find strong evi‐
dence for both sets of predictions. Ideological divisions in judicial vot‐
ing patterns are more pronounced in the standard‐like second step of
Gingles than in the evaluation of the more rule‐like factors—precisely
the opposite of what one might suspect given the existing literature’s
preoccupation with ideological disagreements over the rule‐like fac‐
tors. Moreover, over time the Gingles factors that both judges and
scholars claim are central to the liability inquiry have become far less
important. Judges—particularly Democratic appointees—have con‐
cluded less frequently that liability should follow immediately from
satisfaction of the Gingles preconditions. Courts’ sharp movement away
from the centrality of the Gingles factors amounts to a largely unrecog‐
nized second transformation of voting rights litigation.
Uncovering this overlooked transformation enriches our under‐
standing of how the Voting Rights Act has functioned over its near half‐
century life span. Among other things, it provides important evidence
about how federal courts respond to the changes in the political and
social circumstances that give rise to voting rights litigation, as well as
an additional way to evaluate the doctrinal tools that structure that
litigation. In this vein, one might see the transformation in the actual
practices of lower courts as something of an endorsement of federal
judges’ capacities for change. It may reflect judicial responsiveness to
the changing racial and partisan consequences of voting rights claims
during this period. But the transformation also suggests that these
were changes with which the doctrinal framework itself could not keep
pace. The growing irrelevance of the Gingles framework itself might
thus be seen as a critique of the Supreme Court’s efforts to create an
objective framework for mediating judicial involvement in the political
thicket of minority vote dilution claims.

6

See text accompanying notes 39–47.

File: Cox‐Miles draft 081908.doc

2008]

Created on: 8/19/08 5:34 PM

Rules, Standards, and Ideology

Last Printed: 8/19/08 10:57 PM

5

I. DOCTRINE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
This Part sets the stage by sketching two central aspects of litiga‐
tion under the Voting Rights Act. Part I.A describes the formal trans‐
formation of Section 2 litigation in Thornburg v Gingles. This transfor‐
mation gave rise to the rules‐plus‐standard doctrinal framework that
provides a unique opportunity for analysis. Part I.B lays out the
changes in the nature of voting rights litigation that took place in the
two decades following Gingles—changes with profound implications
for the doctrinal framework.
A.

Congress, the Court, and Thornburg v Gingles

The Voting Rights Act7 was enacted in 1965 to combat America’s
long history of excluding African‐Americans from politics.8 Minority
voters had been constitutionally entitled to the franchise since the
adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the wake of
the Civil War.9 But these formal legal protections had been mostly dead
letter since shortly after the end of Reconstruction. Throughout the
South, states used a variety of legal mechanisms, often backed by in‐
timidation and violence, to prevent African‐Americans from registering
to vote and casting ballots.10 Although courts (and eventually Congress)
occasionally intervened,11 as of 1965 African‐Americans in many
Southern states were still registered to vote in only trivial numbers.12
The Voting Rights Act attacked this discrimination in three ways.
First, the Act specifically prohibited (in certain parts of the country) the
use of some legal restrictions on the franchise—such as literacy re‐
quirements—that were often applied in a discriminatory fashion to
prevent potential minority voters from registering.13 Second, Section 5
of the Act subjected the election practices of some states and local gov‐

7
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89‐110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 42 USC
§ 1971 et seq (2006).
8
See Richard M. Valelly, The Voting Rights Act: Securing the Ballot ix, 258 (CQ 2006).
9
See US Const Amend XIV, § 1; US Const Amend XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
10 See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the
United States 258–59 (Basic 2000); Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution
1863–1877 550–63 (Harper Perennial 1989).
11 See, for example, Nixon v Herndon, 273 US 536, 540–41 (1927) (striking down a white‐
only primary in Texas).
12 See J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the
Second Reconstruction 55, 145, 201 (North Carolina 1999).
13 See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4, 79 Stat at 438–39, codified as amended at 42 USC
§§ 1973b–73c (proscribing unlawful use of certain tests or devices as a prerequisite for voting or
registration to vote). [FC at n 7]
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ernments to ongoing federal oversight: these jurisdictions were prohib‐
ited from changing their electoral rules without first preclearing those
changes through the Justice Department.14 While the formula that de‐
termined which jurisdictions were covered was facially neutral, it was
carefully crafted to pick out nearly all of the Deep South states for over‐
sight.15 Third, Section 2 of the Act created a private right of action
authorizing minority voters to sue in federal court to secure their vot‐
ing rights. That provision closely tracked the language of the Fifteenth
Amendment, prohibiting states and political subdivisions from apply‐
ing a voting rule “to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.”16
Section 2 was little used by litigants during the first decade and a
half following the passage of the Voting Rights Act. This is not to say
that there was no voting rights litigation during this period. Quite the
contrary. But perhaps because of Section 2’s similarity to the language
of the 15th Amendment, nearly all voting rights litigation was brought
directly under the Reconstruction Amendments.17 Nonetheless, this
constitutional litigation would eventually prompt the revision of Sec‐
tion 2’s statutory language and lead to the first transformation in vot‐
ing rights litigation. It is therefore helpful to understand how that liti‐
gation developed.
The first generation of constitutional litigation concerned claims of
“vote denial”—claims that particular legal rules and practices unlaw‐
fully denied minority voters access to the ballot. Plaintiffs brought such
claims against poll taxes, grandfather clauses, and so forth.18 But they

14 See 42 USCA § 1973c (1965) (setting up judicial and administrative procedures that
covered jurisdictions were required to follow to ensure that new voting qualifications “will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color”).
15 See 42 USC § 1973b(b) (1965) (establishing that the proscriptions on use of certain vot‐
ing tests will apply to states that have had less than 50 percent of residents of voting age regis‐
tered as of specified dates).
16 Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat at 437, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1973(a) [FC
at n 7.]. Compare US Const Amend XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previ‐
ous condition of servitude.”).
17 See, for example, White v Regester, 422 US 935, 935–36 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that
parts of Texas’s redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by diluting the votes of
minorities); Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124, 127 (1971) (“We have before us in this case the valid‐
ity under the Equal Protection Clause of the statutes districting and apportioning the State of
Indiana for its general assembly elections.”). Consider also Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 US 339, 340,
345–46 (1960) (relying, prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, on the Fifteenth Amendment
to evaluate a statute that allegedly redrew the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee in order to seg‐
regate voters by race). [AP]
18 See, for example, Harper v Virginia State Board Of Elections, 383 US 663, 666, 670 (1966)
(invalidating a Virginia poll tax of $1.50 because it denied “the opportunity for equal participation
by all voters” as required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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quickly realized that bare access to the ballot was insufficient to guar‐
antee electoral equality. Litigation turned to second‐generation claims
of “vote dilution”—claims that particular electoral rules or practices
unlawfully diluted the votes of minority voters. Plaintiffs first brought
vote dilution claims against at‐large (and multimember district) voting
arrangements.19 Over time, single‐member districting schemes and
other practices were also challenged as vote dilutive.
Courts were initially somewhat receptive to vote dilution claims.
But in Mobile v Bolden,20 which concerned the at‐large system used to
elect Mobile’s County Commission, the Supreme Court issued two hold‐
ings that brought vote dilution litigation to a near standstill. First, the
Supreme Court held that the 15th Amendment prohibited only inten
tional racial discrimination in voting.21 Second, the Court confirmed
that it considered Section 2 to be only a restatement of the Fifteenth
Amendment’s protections.22 These twin holdings meant that the plain‐
tiffs in every voting rights case would have to prove that a voting prac‐
tice was enacted or maintained for an invidious purpose in order to
obtain relief under either the constitution or Section 2. Bolden’s effect
was said to be devastating: “Existing cases were overturned and dis‐
missed,” and a good deal of voting rights litigation ground to a halt.23
The Court’s holding in Bolden sparked the first transformation of
voting rights litigation. In response to widespread criticism of the case,
Congress in 1982 amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.24 The
amendment, designed to overturn Bolden’s statutory holding, re‐
worded Section 2 to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is

19 See White v Regester, 412 US 755, 765–66 (1973); Whitcomb, 403 US at 142, 142–44[FC
at n 17]; Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights [CQ “Rights”] To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
Tex L Rev 1705, 1705–06 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court’s development of vote dilution
doctrine). Plaintiffs argued that such systems diluted the votes of minority voters in part by sub‐
merging their votes within a larger white majority. To remedy the dilution, plaintiffs often asked
courts to break up an at‐large system into several single member districts so that minority voters
would have a greater chance of electing a candidate of their choice in a least one of these districts.
20 446 US 55 (1980).
21 See id at 62 (plurality) (affirming the principle that “racially discriminatory motivation is
a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation”).
22 Id at 61 (plurality) (“In view of [Section 2’s] language and its sparse but clear legislative
history, it is evident that this statutory provision adds nothing to the appellees’ Fifteenth Amend‐
ment claim.”).
23 Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in Chandler
Davidson, ed, Minority Vote Dilution 145, 149 (Howard 1989). See also Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela
S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process 563,
595 (Foundation 3d ed 2007) (explaining that the case “threw a substantial obstacle in the path of
minority plaintiffs” and “virtually shut down” vote dilution suits). [AR]
24 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 3, 96 Stat at 134, codified at 42 USC
§1973.[FC at n 1.]
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not required to make out a claim of vote dilution.25 Moreover, the
amendment was accompanied by a Senate report suggesting that
courts evaluate vote dilution claims using a multifactor totality of the
circumstances test that had been developed by lower courts in pre‐
Bolden cases.26
The Supreme Court interpreted the amended Section 2 for the first
time in 1986, in the now‐seminal case of Thornburg v Gingles. But
rather than focusing on the multifactor test suggested in the Senate
Report and embodied in earlier lower court case law, the Court fash‐

25 Prior to 1982, the provision prohibited states from using any voting practice “to deny or
abridge” minority voting rights. The 1982 Amendment changed the Section 2’s language from
active to passive voice, so that it prohibited states from using any voting practice “in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of” minority voting rights. Compare The Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89‐110, title I, sec. 2, 79 Stat. 437, with 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2004). To further
emphasize that this grammatical change was meant to eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs
show intentional discrimination, Congress also elaborated on what was required for liability. As
amended, Section 2 now requires plaintiffs to show that, “based on the totality of circumstances
[CQ] . . . the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivi‐
sion are not equally open to participation” by minority voters—a condition satisfied when those
voters “have less opportunity than other [voters] . . . to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice.” 42 USC § 1973(b)[FC at n .1].
26 See Voting Rights Act, S Rep No 97‐417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 28–29 (1982), reprinted in
1982 USCCAN 177, 204–07: [CQ]

[Block]To establish a violation, plaintiffs could show a variety of factors, depending upon the
kind of rule, practice, or procedure called into question.
Typical factors include: (1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register,
to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; (2) the extent to which voting
in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; (3) the extent to
which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority
vote requirements, anti‐single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; (4) if there is a
candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied ac‐
cess to that process; (5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employ‐
ment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in
the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence
to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group [and]
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualifica‐
tion, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
While these enumerated factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other fac‐
tors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.
The cases demonstrate, and the Committee intends that there is no requirement that any
particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the
other. [End block, no indent]
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ioned a new doctrinal framework for evaluating Section 2 claims. The
Gingles framework focused the inquiry on the actual behavior of voters:
it moved the existence of racially polarized voting and its effect on the
electoral success of minority‐preferred candidates to the center of the
judicial inquiry.27 Specifically, the new doctrinal structure included
three rule‐like preconditions for liability: it required plaintiffs to prove
(1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
compact; (2) that the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3)
that white voters vote as a bloc and thereby typically defeat minority‐
preferred candidates.28
The Supreme Court eventually clarified that the three Gingles fac‐
tors are necessary but not sufficient conditions for liability under Sec‐
tion 2.29 Once the preconditions are satisfied, a court is still required to
engage in a multifactor balancing inquiry (focusing on the factors iden‐
tified in the 1982 Senate report) before determining whether vote dilu‐
tion exists.30 In other words, Section 2 doctrine is formally structured
as a two‐stage inquiry—the first stage more rigidly rule‐like, the sec‐
ond involving a softer totality of the circumstances test. In practice,
however, prominent opinions by lower courts have continued to
downplay the significance of the second stage.31 The idea of the primacy
of the first stage Gingles factors remains pervasive.
These changes—to the statute and the doctrinal structure—had
two transformative consequences. First, Section 2 became the central
27 [CQ no signal]Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Trans
formation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 Mich L Rev 1833, 1851–52 (1992).
28 Gingles, 478 US at 48–51[FC at n 2.]. Both courts and commentators concur that the
doctrinal inquiry became more rule‐like by focusing initially on these three factors rather than the
nine Senate factors. See McNeil v Springfield Park District, 851 F2d 937, 942 (7th Cir 1988) (“It
reins in the almost unbridled discretion that section 2 gives the courts, focusing the inquiry so
plaintiffs with promising claims can develop a full record.”); Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The
Law of Democracy at 618–19 (cited in note 23) (“Are the three Gingles factors more ‘objective’ in
some sense than the Senate Report factors? If they are, is Gingles yet another manifestation of the
[Supreme] Court’s preference for bright‐line tests?”).
29 See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1011 (1994) (“[Gingles] clearly declined to hold [the
three factors] sufficient in combination, either in the sense that a court’s examination of relevant
circumstances was complete once the three factors were found to exist, or in the sense that the
three in combination necessarily and in all circumstances demonstrated dilution.”).
30 See id at 1011–12.
31 See, for example, Thompson v Glades County Board of County Commissioners, 493 F3d
1253, 1260–61 (11th Cir 2007):

[block]Although [ ] satisfying the three Gingles requirements is not, by itself, sufficient to es‐
tablish vote dilution[,] . . . it would be only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can
establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a violation
of § 2 under the totality of circumstances. [end block, no indent]
United States v Charleston County, 316 F Supp 2d 268, 277 (D SC 2003) (“[I]t will be only the very
unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of the three Gingles factors but still
have failed to establish a violation of § 2 under the totality of the circumstances.”). [EIO]

File: Cox‐Miles draft 081908.doc

10

Created on: 8/19/08 5:34 PM

The University of Chicago Law Review

Last Printed: 8/19/08 10:57 PM

[75:xxx

tool of modern vote dilution litigation. After 1982, nearly every vote
dilution challenge to an electoral practice included a claim that the
practice violated Section 2, whether the lawsuit concerned an at‐large
electoral arrangement, a statewide redistricting scheme, a felon disen‐
franchisement statute, or some other type of voting practice.32
Second, these changes created a two‐stage, rule‐plus‐standard
doctrinal structure for Section 2 litigation. Within this framework, the
first stage quickly assumed central importance: the three doctrinal pre‐
conditions in the first step of Gingles came to be seen as the linchpin of
the liability inquiry in modern voting rights litigation. Liability was
thought overwhelmingly to rise or fall with the presence or absence of
the three requirements laid out by Justice Brennan in that case.
Within the judiciary, this view was articulated as early as Gingles
itself. Writing separately in that case, Justice O’Connor argued that
Brennan’s three‐pronged test made electoral success the touchstone of
vote dilution claims while rendering all other factors nearly irrele‐
vant.33 Over time, this view came to be commonplace among lower
courts as well. Lower courts have repeatedly reiterated that “it will be
only the very unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the exis‐
tence of the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a vio‐
lation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances.”34
Among scholars, the central importance of Gingles’ doctrinal
framework has come to frame many debates in the field of election
law.35 Perhaps the quickest way to get a sense of Gingles’ dominance is
32 See Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 596 (cited in note 23) (“[Since
1982], the bulk of racial vote dilution litigation [has taken] place under section 2, rather than
under either section 5 or the Constitution.”).
33 Gingles, 478 US at 90–93[FC at n 2.] (O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (stating that
the Justice Brennan’s doctrinal framework in Gingles amounts to a dramatic transformation that
makes electoral success “the true test of vote dilution,” while rendering the other factors of the
totality of the circumstances approach nearly irrelevant).
34 Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Education, 4 F3d 1103, 1135 (3d
Cir 1993). See Nipper v Smith, 39 F3d 1494, 1525 (11th Cir 1994) (“[R]ather, proof of the second
and third Gingles factors will ordinarily create a sufficient inference that racial bias is at work.”);
Uno v City of Holyoke, 72 F3d 973, 983 (1st Cir 1995) (“We predict that cases will be rare in which
plaintiffs establish the Gingles preconditions yet fail on a section 2 claim because other facts un‐
dermine the original inference.”); NAACP v City of Niagara Falls, 65 F3d 1002, 1019–20 n 21 (2d
Cir 1995) (quoting Jenkins); Clark v Calhoun County, 88 F3d 1393, 1396 (5th Cir 1996) (quoting
Jenkins and noting that “unlawful vote dilution ‘may be readily imagined and unsurprising’ where
the three Gingles preconditions exist”); NAACP v Fordice, 252 F3d 361, 374 (5th Cir 2001) (quoting
Clark for the proposition that liability will usually follow in cases where the Gingles factors obtain,
and noting that, as a result, any district court holding against liability after finding those precondi‐
tions satisfied is required to explain its conclusion with great particularity); Black Political Task
Force v Galvin, 300 F Supp 2d 291, 310–11 (D Mass 2004) (citing Jenkins).
35 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 Harv L Rev 1359, 1364–89
(1995) (discussing the role of “safe” minority‐dominated districting in increasing black represen‐
tation and in the redistribution of partisan power in the South in the aftermath of Gingles); J.
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to flip through two leading election law case books. These casebooks
devote the vast majority of their coverage of Section 2 litigation to Gin
gles and the elaboration of its three‐pronged test.36 Moreover, debates
about the three preconditions have garnered by far the bulk of com‐
mentary and intellectual interest in Section 2 litigation. A vast litera‐
ture considers myriad questions about what exactly each of the three
Gingles prongs requires. Can minority voters satisfy the first prong
even if they are insufficiently numerous to constitute a majority of a
single‐member district? Can a multiracial coalition of voters constitute
a single cohesive minority group for purposes of the second prong? Can
the third prong be satisfied even when a nontrivial fraction of white
voters are willing to vote for a minority‐preferred candidate? These
technical questions dominate the scholarship concerning modern vote
dilution litigation.
B.

The Changing Nature of Vote Dilution Litigation

The development of the modern doctrinal framework in Gingles is
only half of the story. Since that framework was laid down there have
been substantial changes in the nature of vote dilution litigation. In the
years immediately following Section 2’s amendment, vote dilution liti‐
gation most often targeted at‐large and multimember voting arrange‐
ments in areas where voting was extremely racially polarized and
where minority voters had almost no success electing their preferred
candidates. Thornburg v Gingles itself involved just such a voting sys‐
tem. In a multimember and at‐large district, several officials are elected
from a single geographic district. Voters are permitted to cast one bal‐
lot for each official to be selected. As O’Connor concluded in her con‐
currence in Gingles, this electoral arrangement can submerge the vot‐
ing power of the minority electorate, as compared to the alternative of
using several single‐member districts to elect the officials.37 The Gingles
preconditions are designed to capture the possibility of such submer‐
Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights
Law, 27 USF L Rev 551, 561–69 (1993) (arguing that there is no bright line between the three
Gingles prongs and that they should be read together in recognition of the fact that there is no
meaningful distinction between minority control districts and minority influence districts); Rich‐
ard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evalu
ating ElectionDistrict Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483, 486–592 (1993);
Katharine I. Butler and Richard Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minor
ity Groups: Can a “Rainbow Coalition” Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 Pac L J 619,
641–74 (1990).
36 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen, Election Law: Cases and Materials 187–
244 (Carolina Academic[CQ] 3d ed 2004); Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at
595–711 (cited in note 23).
37 Gingles, 478 US at 87[FC at n 2.] (O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he at‐large
or multimember district has an inherent tendency to submerge the votes of the minority.”).
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gence. Oversimplifying a bit, the test identifies the circumstances under
which minority voters could control the outcome of an election in a
single‐member district, but where, in the presence of racially polarized
voting, they will be unable to elect a candidate of their choice in an at‐
large arrangement.38 In these situations, judicial intervention seemed
relatively uncontroversial: intervening meant substituting some minor‐
ity success for none, and the difficult questions concerning how to draw
the single‐member districts could be left largely to the remedial stages
of the litigation.
Over time, however, two features of Section 2 lawsuits changed.
First, plaintiffs began to challenge more single‐member redistricting
practices in areas where minority voters had already achieved some
level of electoral success. These challenges focused on the question of
how many majority‐minority districts to draw, and on where to draw
them, rather than on whether to disaggregate a multimember district
within which minority voters had never succeeded in electing a minor‐
ity‐preferred candidate.39 Second, the political demographics underly‐
ing Section 2 lawsuits began to change. Throughout the 1990s, levels of
racially polarized voting declined in some parts of the South. This
meant that growing numbers of white voters became willing, in some
places, to vote for minority‐preferred candidates.40
These twin changes altered the significance of the Gingles precon‐
ditions and the consequences of treating those preconditions as central
proof of unlawful vote dilution. Rick Pildes, Sam Issacharoff, and others
have discussed these changes in considerable detail, but for present
purposes we note briefly three consequences of these changes in case
composition.
First, treating the Gingles preconditions as strong indicators of li‐
ability created the possibility in these later cases that Section 2 would
require the creation of majority‐minority districts in excess of what
would be required even by a system of proportional representation.
38 To better see this possibility, imagine a stylized example in which three officials are
elected from a multimember district containing 700 white voters and 200 black voters. As noted
above, each voter is permitted to vote for each official to be elected. In other words, if all voters
participate, there are 900 votes cast for each available seat—700 by white voters and 200 by black
voters. If voting is perfectly racially polarized, it is easy to see that white voters will control the
election of all three officials. But this result could change if the multimember district was divided
into three single‐member districts containing 300 voters each. If all of the black voters were
placed in one such district, they would constitute a majority of that district and could elect a can‐
didate of their choice.
39 See notes 17–20 and accompanying text (discussing the changes over time in case
composition) [AR]; Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 673–700 (cited in note
23) (same). [AR]
40 See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War With Itself? Social Science and
Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 NC L Rev 1517, 1522 (2002).
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The preconditions suggest that a minority‐controlled district may be
required wherever a sufficiently large and compact group of minority
voters exists—implicitly incorporating an idea of representational
maximization into the doctrinal test.41
Second, it became less clear in these later cases that the
representational interests of minority voters would be advanced by
treating the Gingles preconditions as nearly synonymous with vote
dilution. The Gingles framework is geared towards increasing the
descriptive representation of minority voters: as we explained above,
the test generally specifies the conditions under which it will be
possible to draw an electoral district in which minority voters can elect
a candidate of their choice, which in practice typically has meant a
minority legislator.42 When the Gingles test was introduced, it was
generally assumed that using Section 2 to increase the descriptive
representation of minority voters would also increase their substantive
representation—that is, that electing more minority legislators would
increase the likelihood that the interests of minority voters would be
reflected in the legislative process.43 Over time, however, this
assumption became more contested. As litigation shifted toward single‐
member districting plans, and as voting patterns became less racially
polarized, some scholars began to conclude that using Section 2 to
increase minority descriptive representation might in certain cases—
particularly in cases where Section 2 was used to force the drawing of
majority‐minority districts—impair minority substantive represent‐
ation by packing excessive numbers of minority voters into a few
districts.44
Third, the partisan valence of the Gingles preconditions changed
over time. In the multimember context of Thornburg v Gingles, it was
generally thought that increasing the descriptive representation of mi‐
nority voters would, if anything, benefit the Democratic Party. African‐
American voters identified overwhelmingly with the Democratic

41 For evidence of the Court’s concern about this possibility, see De Grandy, 512 US at 1016–
17 [FC at n 29.](cautioning that “reading the first Gingles condition in effect to define dilution as a
failure to maximize in the face of bloc voting . . . causes its own danger” and that “[f]ailure to
maximize cannot be the measure of § 2”).
42 See note 38 and accompanying text.
43 In Hannah Pitkin’s classic formulation, “descriptive” representation is concerned with
representing the identity of a voter while “substantive” representation is concerned with repre‐
senting the interests of a voter. See Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60–61, 209
(California 1972).
44 See, for example, David T. Canon, Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended
Consequences of Black Majority Districts 74 (Chicago 1999); Carol M. Swain, Black Faces, Black
Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress 229 (Harvard 1995).
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Party,45 and the combination of multimember districting with high lev‐
els of racial polarization left them with little influence over elections.
But the turn toward single‐member district litigation and declines in
racially polarized voting changed this calculus. Once minority voters
could control or influence elections with the crossover support of some
white Democrats, the Gingles preconditions’ pressure to create major‐
ity‐minority districts threatened to pack minority voters into exces‐
sively safe Democratic districts. Such packing could waste Democratic
votes and ultimately benefit the Republican Party.46 Some commenta‐
tors began to argue in the late 1990s that safe districting practices
were doing just this.47
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO DOCTRINE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Congress’s amendment of Section 2 was tremendously important
to modern voting rights litigation. And Thornburg v Gingles was an im‐
portant acknowledgment by the Court that the actual behavior of
groups of voters was critical to any understanding of the concept of
vote dilution. But this formal story of jurisprudential change leaves out
how judges actually applied the Gingles test in specific cases. This leads
the doctrinal story to miss important features of Voting Rights Act liti‐
gation by overlooking the significance for judicial decisionmaking of
Gingles’s two‐stage, rule‐plus‐standard doctrinal structure. The way
courts apply Gingles in practice can give us new insights into how
judges respond to rules and standards. Moreover, comprehensive data
about the application of Gingles can help us understand how judges
reacted to recent changes in the consequences of vote dilution litiga‐
tion for both minority voters and the major political parties.

45 See Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 Yale L J 734, 743–44 (2008)
(noting the rise in the South of a Democratic Party “newly remade with African American voters as
one of its core constituencies” after enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
46 The potential tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation, as well as the
potential political consequences, were made particularly salient by a few events in the early
1990s. Perhaps the most prominent was the 1994 landslide national election victory for the Re‐
publican Party. Before the 1994 election, discussions of the representational tradeoffs and parti‐
san consequences of drawing majority‐minority districts were mostly theoretical. But after that
election there was considerable coverage in the popular press of the potential connections be‐
tween Voting Rights Act enforcement and the Republican victory. And within a few years, a large
political science literature emerged that was dedicated to measuring these representational and
partisan effects. See note 47.
47 See, for example, David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss, Racial Redistricting and Realignment
in Southern State Legislatures, 44 Am J Polit Sci 792, 793 (2000); David Lublin, The Paradox of
Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress 36–37, 99 (Princeton
1997); compare Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, Do MajorityMinority
Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 Am Polit Sci Rev 794, 794
(1996).
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Hypotheses: Rules, Standards, and Ideological Disagreement

In our earlier work, we found persistent ideological differences in
the rates at which judges assigned liability under Section 2 of the Vot‐
ing Rights Act.48 How are these ideological disagreements channeled by
(or reflected in) the doctrinal structure of vote dilution litigation? As
described above, Gingles framed the judicial inquiry as a two‐part se‐
quential test with a more rule‐like inquiry preceding a more standard‐
like one. Legal scholars have long discussed the advantages and disad‐
vantages of rules relative to standards.49 Two aspects of this literature
are particularly relevant here: discretion and flexibility.
1. Discretion.
Rules deprive a decisionmaker of discretion.50 Rules announce ex
ante the criteria according to which legal entitlements will be allocated.
In a fully specified rule, the criteria are an exhaustive list of the consid‐
erations relevant to allocating the legal entitlement as well as a de‐
scription of the relative importance and sequencing of each considera‐
tion. A decisionmaker applying a fully specified rule cannot deviate
from the rule’s weighting or consider excluded factors. By restricting a
decisionmaker’s actions, rules may guard against improper and arbi‐
trary uses of authority.51

48

See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 18–49 (cited in note 4).
See, for example, Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv J L & Pub
Policy 101, 101–07 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 953 (1995);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557, 621–23 (1992);
Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decision
Making in Law and in Life 172 (Clarendon 1991) [CQ “DecisionMaking”]; Richard A. Posner, The
Problems of Jurisprudence 42 (Harvard 1990); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administra
tive Rules, 93 Yale L J 65, 65 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudi
cation, 89 Harv L Rev 1685, 1687–88 (1976); Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Leg Stud 257, 257 (1974); Kenneth C. Davis, Discretionary Justice:
A Preliminary Inquiry 216 (Louisiana State 1969).
50 See Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 961 (cited in note 49) (describing a “continuum” of possible
systems “from rules to untrammeled discretion, with factors, guidelines, and standards falling in
between”); Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 150–51, 158–62 (cited in note 49) (arguing that a
preference for rules may be justified as a power allocation device and by a desire to reduce the
risk of bias by particular decisionmakers ); Posner, Problems of Jurisprudence at 44 (cited in note
49) (“A rule suppresses potentially relevant circumstances of the dispute . . . while a standard
gives the trier of fact . . . more discretion because there are more facts to find, weigh and com‐
pare.”); Davis, Discretionary Justice at 4 (cited in note 49) (“A public officer has discretion when‐
ever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of
action or inaction.”)[CQ. Order of authorities].
51 See Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 976 (cited in note 49) (“[R]ules reduce the risk that illegiti‐
mate or irrelevant factors will enter into the decision, at least compared with standards or fac‐
tors.”); Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 609 (cited in note 49) (“Rules may be preferred to standards in
order to limit discretion, thereby minimizing abuses of power.”).
49
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Less dramatically, rules may prevent a decisionmaker’s own policy
preferences from influencing her decision. A decisionmaker may con‐
sciously attempt to advance her own idiosyncratic objectives through a
decision. Or preferences may operate at an unconscious level, such as
in the implicit weighting of particular factors. By limiting the criteria
for decisions and governing the conversion of those criteria into out‐
comes, rules permit less opportunity for a decisionmaker’s identity,
preferences, or value judgments to influence the decision.
In voting rights cases, the first step of the Gingles framework is
more rule‐like in that it specifies three conditions that must be present
in order for liability to be assigned. The test is structured as a checklist
in which the court merely assesses the presence or absence of each of
the three conditions: the size and geographic compactness of the mi‐
nority group, the political cohesion of the minority group, and the pres‐
ence of white bloc–voting.52 To be sure, there has always been some
ambiguity about what each factor requires—as is the case for nearly all
legal tests, given that rules and standards exist on a spectrum rather
than as purely dichotomous categories.53 But the Gingles preconditions
do not call upon the court to assign relative weights to or balance the
importance of these conditions. Each factor is a necessary precondition.
Moreover, the first step in the Gingles framework does not allow the
court to consider factors other than the three already specified. A judge
may not, for example, discuss in the first step the presence or absence
of a history of discrimination in the jurisdiction.
In contrast, the second step of the Gingles framework is much
more standard‐like. It requires the court to assess whether, “in the to‐
tality of the circumstances,” a finding of vote dilution is appropriate.54
This second step does provide some guidance to courts: it incorporates
the nine factors that the 1982 Senate Report suggested are relevant to
the inquiry.55 But that report did not explain how courts should balance
the importance of each factor, and it expressly declined to treat the
enumerated factors as an exhaustive list.56
In light of this doctrinal structure, our first hypothesis is that the
rule‐like first step of Gingles will better cabin the influence of judicial
ideology than the standard‐like second step. This leads to the simple
prediction that there will be greater disagreement between Democratic
and Republican appointees at the second step than the first.
52

See Gingles, 478 US at 50–51[FC at n 2.].
See note 50.
54 See 478 US at 79[FC at n 2.].
55 See S Rep No 97‐417 at 28–29 (cited in note 26).
56 See id at 29 (“[T]he Committee intends that there is no requirement that any particular
number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.”).
53
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To see this more clearly, consider a judge who for ideological rea‐
sons prefers a particular outcome in a Section 2 case. The judges faces
a choice: she may distort the rule‐like preconditions to reach her pre‐
ferred outcome, or she may massage the totality‐of‐the‐circumstances
test to do so. The constraining power of rules makes the first option
more costly than the second. This cost may take several forms. It may
be that higher courts will be more likely to reverse decisions that con‐
flict with the rule because the legal error is more obvious.57 But even
without reference to the hierarchical structure of courts, a rule may
make it costly for a judge to impose her policy preferences. When a rule
and a judge’s preferred policy outcome conflict, the task of writing an
opinion that reconciles the rule and the outcome is more difficult.
There is no guarantee this effort will be successful. It may fail to per‐
suade co‐panelists who have different policy preferences or who value
fidelity to the rule above their preferred policy outcomes. It may even
provoke a colleague into dissenting in order to expose the rule‐
disregarding judge’s reasoning as a fig leaf. Whether in dissent or ma‐
jority, the judge who necessitates the drafting of a separate opinion
taxes the collegiality of the bench.58 The weakness of the rule‐
disregarding judge’s reasoning or the reprimand of her colleague may
prompt colleagues to view her future work with circumspection.
The fact that it is more costly to express ideological disagreement
through the application of a rule leads to the prediction that ideological
disagreements should be less pronounced in the application of Gingles’s
rule‐like preconditions. Those disagreements will be channeled more
frequently into the standard‐like second step.
We should note that our examination of judicial ideology and the
Gingles doctrine has much in common with the literature on the strate‐
gic use of legal instruments developed by Emerson Tiller.59 In the stra‐
57 Relatedly, the fact that federal appellate courts must give greater deference to lower court
fact‐findings may also raise the cost of relying on Gingles’s rule‐like preconditions, as their appli‐
cation is somewhat less fact‐intensive than the totality test.
58 Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 32‐34 (2008) (describing “dissent aversion”)..
59 See Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U Chi L Rev 715, 722–24 (2008) (predicting
and presenting evidence that a trial judge makes sentencing “departures,” a predominantly legal
determination, more often when the reviewing appellate court is politically aligned, and makes
sentencing “adjustments,” a more fact‐based determination, when the reviewing court is not
aligned)[AR]; Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging under the U.S. Sen
tencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 24 (2007)
(same)[AR]; Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Admin
istrative Law, 31 J Leg Stud 61, 70–81 (2002) (finding empirically that as the “strategic instru‐
ment” perspective suggests, lower court judges behave strategically in using different agency
reversal instruments depending on their policy preferences); Emerson H. Tiller, and Pablo T.
Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J L,
Econ, & Org 349 (1999) (arguing that agencies and courts insulate their policy choices from
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tegic instruments model, judges seeking to advance their ideological
preferences choose the legal materials on which to base their decisions
according to whether appellate reviewers are likely to share their ideo‐
logical preferences. Decisions based on facts or procedure rather than
interpretations of substantive law have less precedential effect but are
harder for appellate reviewers to reverse. Judges face a tradeoff be‐
tween precedential effect and risk of reversal, and the alignment of the
judge’s and the appellate court’s ideological preferences influences this
tradeoff. When a high fraction of the appellate court shares a judge’s
ideological preferences, she is more likely to render a decision on the
basis of a legal interpretation. But when only a small fraction of the
appellate court shares a judge’s preferences, she is more likely to base
her decision on facts or procedure. Strategic instrument models thus
offer predictions about how judicial hierarchy influences a judge’s
choice between legal materials.
While our approach shares much of the spirit of the strategic in‐
strument models, the question we ask is fundamentally different. We
ask whether judges are more consistently ideological when applying
rule‐like tests than standard‐like tests. Moreover, our account is in
some ways a simpler one. Our inquiry does not turn on the impact of
court hierarchy or the risk of appellate review. Nor does it flow from
any difference between law and fact, or substance and procedure.60 Our
approach depends solely on whether a judge may reach an ideologi‐
cally preferred outcome more readily when applying a standard rather
than a rule.
2. Flexibility.
Rules are relatively inflexible. Because they fix the decisionmaking
calculus ex ante, they conform poorly to new circumstances. As a result,
change in society may render rules “anachronistic” and “hopelessly
outmoded.”63 Standards, in contrast, are more readily adapted to new
and unanticipated situations. They are unlikely to provide an exclusive
enumeration of relevant considerations or to specify the ordering or

higher‐level [CQ hyphen.]review by choosing high‐decision‐cost instruments that discourage
further review).
60 A further difference is that, unlike the strategic instrument models in which judges may
choose their legal materials, the two steps of the Gingles test are joined by an “and.” Rather than
picking between the rule‐like portion and the standard‐like portion, judges can only pick where to
express their ideological preferences.
63 Sunstein, 83 Cal L Rev at 993–94 (cited in note 49) (explaining how rules can be outrun
by changing circumstances).
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weighting of those considerations. Thus, more of the decisionmaking
structure is fleshed out ex post.64
This second insight of the literature on rules and standards has
important implications for our analysis of Section 2 litigation. The Gin
gles framework does make it possible for courts to respond to changing
social conditions—but only in one direction. The first‐rules, then‐
standards sequence of the test implies that the framework can be used
to reduce the scope of liability but not to expand it. The totality of the
circumstances test may be used to defeat liability even when a claim
satisfies the rule‐like preconditions.65 But if a judge feels that the total‐
ity of the circumstances warrants liability, she cannot impose it in the
absence of satisfaction of the rule‐like first stage because the three
first‐stage factors are necessary conditions for liability.66 Accordingly,
the Gingles structure is not symmetric.
Gingles’s asymmetric doctrinal structure prompts several
speculations about how its application will evolve over time. The first is
that, as more decisions under the framework emerge, the circum‐
stances in which liability is not warranted even though the rule‐like
preconditions are met will become clearer. As these precedents
accumulate, the boundaries of liability may become clearer or may
shrink. These changes may lead to a series of familiar Priest‐Klein‐like
predictions: plaintiffs may be deterred from bringing marginal claims,
and defendants may be persuaded to settle strong claims.69 The
standard selection‐of‐disputes‐for‐litigation analysis would predict
64 Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 616–17 (cited in note 49) (explaining how “a standard promul‐
gated decades ago can be applied to conduct in the recent past using present understandings”
while “rules must be changed, which may require more effort”); Schauer, Playing by the Rules at
140–42 (cited in note 49) (noting that rules offer predictability at the cost of “diminishing [ ]
capacity to adapt to a changing future”).
65 In this sense, the totality of the circumstances in this test acts as a “trump” on the rule‐like
portion. See Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at 560–61 n 5 (cited in note 49) (describing the concern about
“whether rules can be binding” as centering on “whether there is any content to a rule as long as a
standard can trump the rule”).
66 We do not address in this Article the question why the Supreme Court chose a framework
for analyzing claims under Section 2 that effectively set an upper boundary on the scope of liabil‐
ity. The reasons are likely many. They may include Justice Brennan’s need to cobble together a
sufficient number of votes to announce the judgment of the Court; Brennan’s hope that the Gingles
prongs would become seen as nearly sufficient (rather than just necessary) conditions for liability;
or the Court’s desire to control the discretion of lower court judges. Consider Tonja Jacobi and
Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 326 (2007) (presenting
evidence of the use of legal doctrines as instruments of political control by higher courts); Linda R.
Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 L & Contemp Probs 65, 68–86
(1994) (suggesting that the Supreme Court adopted different doctrines as signals to lower courts
in order to exert policy preferences); Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to
Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and Empirical Test, 69 S Cal L Rev 431, 441–56 (1996)
(offering the same conclusions from a game theoretic perspective).
69 See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J Leg
Stud 1, 6–30 (1984) (presenting a selection theory of litigation in which trials result from litigants’
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selection‐of‐disputes‐for‐litigation analysis would predict that the
number of litigated cases would decline over time, as precedents be‐
came clearer, but that the rate of plaintiff victory would remain per‐
haps unchanged. But in the context of Section 2 litigation there are rea‐
sons to suspect that these standard predictions about the pattern of
litigation may not obtain. The Gingles framework was initially designed
to deal with challenges to at‐large districting arrangements, and these
were the paradigmatic early claims.70 By the mid‐1990s, however, the
types of cases brought began to change significantly. These new cases
were less likely to satisfy the Gingles preconditions. Therefore, it is pos‐
sible that in Section 2 litigation, the rate of plaintiff success may fall
over time along with the number of litigated cases.
Our primary interest, however, lies in the way that judges of dif‐
ferent ideological stripes may use Gingles’s asymmetric structure to
respond to changes over time in the nature of Section 2 litigation. In
Part I we described the ways in which the character of voting rights
litigation changed in the two decades since Gingles: challenges to sin‐
gle‐member districts became more prevalent; racially polarized voting
waned in some jurisdictions. These trends altered the consequences of
treating the Gingles preconditions as strong indicators of liability. First,
they created the possibility that following the Gingles preconditions
would require the creation of even more majority‐minority districts
than would be required by a system of proportional representation.
Second, they raised the possibility that the application of preconditions
would actually impair the substantive representation of minority vot‐
ers. Third, they led to a situation in which the partisan consequences of
following Gingles might shift by making liability under the Act less
beneficial for the Democratic Party.71
These changes in Section 2 litigation suggest two ways in which
we might expect the doctrinal patterns of vote dilution litigation to
change over time. One hypothesis flows from the first and second con‐
sequences described above. If the Gingles preconditions proved over
time to be excessively aggressive in some cases, and representationally
counterproductive in others,72 judges of all political stripes would likely

comparisons of the costs of settlement and trial and, importantly, the estimated probability of
success at trial).[AR]
70 See text accompanying notes 38–40.
71 See notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
72 This does assume that judges are interested, at least in part, in substantive representa‐
tion. See Pitkin, The Concept of Representation at 60–61, 209 (cited in note 43) (elaborating on the
difference between substantive and descriptive representation). To the extent that a judge be‐
lieves that Section 2’s vote dilution inquiry should concern only descriptive representation, she
will obviously be unconcerned if the doctrine threatens to undermine the substantive representa‐
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rely less on the Gingles preconditions as a measure of liability.73 Were
this true, judges who found the Gingles factors satisfied would become
more likely to vote against liability.74
A second hypothesis flows from the third consequence. If the Gin
gles preconditions became more likely to favor the Republican Party
over time (or at least came to have more contested partisan conse‐
quences), we would predict that Democratic appointees would become
less enthusiastic about treating the preconditions as strong evidence of
liability.75 Were this true, Democratic appointees would abandon the
preconditions at a higher rate than Republican appointees—that is, the
likelihood of voting for liability when the Gingles factors were satisfied
would decline for Democratic appointees relative to Republican ap‐
pointees.
Before proceeding, we should note one minor complication. Both
hypotheses implicitly assume that the more rule‐like preconditions
remain relatively unchanged throughout the post‐Gingles period. In
reality, of course, this is an oversimplification. The legal requirements
of the three prongs have been clarified and tweaked by a large body of
case law over the last two decades.76 But these minor changes likely
sharpen our hypotheses. On balance, the changes to the preconditions
tion of minority voters. There is little evidence, however, that federal judges are focused solely on
descriptive representation in these cases, and considerable evidence to the contrary.
73 Judges of both political parties might also more frequently decline to find the precondi‐
tions satisfied. But the constraints imposed by the rule‐like structures of Gingles’s first stage
would limit judges’ ability to do so. Thus, not only would the rate at which judges conclude that
the second stage of Gingles warrants liability decline over time, it would decline more sharply than
the rate at which judges found the preconditions not satisfied.
74 We should note that this hypothesis implicitly assumes that judges with different ideo‐
logical dispositions share similar views about the appropriate theory of minority representation.
If Democratic and Republican appointees operate with divergent theories of minority representa‐
tion they may respond differently to changing representational consequences. As we explained in
Part I, the “representationally counterproductive” changes were ones that threatened to under‐
mine substantive representation relative to descriptive representation. These changes would be
more troubling to a judge who cared about the extent to which Section 2 promoted the substan‐
tive interests of minority voters. A judge who cared only about securing the election of minority
officials would be much less concerned about the changes. Thus, were it the case that Democratic
appointees cared mostly about substantive representation while Republican appointees cared
mostly about descriptive representation, then Democratic appointees would be more likely that
Republican appointees to reduce their reliance on the Gingles preconditions in response to the
changes in Section 2 litigation. Differences in judges’ theories of representation would in that case
provide an additional reason why Democratic appointees in particular might lose enthusiasm for
treating the Gingles preconditions as nearly sole determinants of liability.
75 We might also expect Democratic and Republican appointees to respond differently if
Democratic appointees were more concerned than Republican appointees about promoting sub‐
stantive (rather than descriptive) minority representation.
76 See Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 596–672, 764–807 (cited in
note 23) (surveying some of these changes); supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (discussing the
centrality over the past two decades of debates about the elaboration of and changes to the pre‐
conditions’ precise contours).
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have arguably made them a harder hurdle to clear. Some lower courts
have imposed a causation requirement on prong 2 of the test;77 others
have interpreted prong 1 to disallow coalition‐ and influence‐district
claims that Justice Brennan refused to rule out in Gingles itself;78 and so
on.79 To the extent the preconditions have become more difficult to sat‐
isfy, we would predict that judges would become more likely to find
liability once the preconditions were satisfied. Our hypotheses above,
however, predict that (either all or at least Democratic) judges will be‐
come less likely to do so. Thus, our assumption that the legal content of
the preconditions remained fixed, should, if anything, stack the deck
against us.
* * *
To summarize our hypotheses, a comparison of the rule‐ and stan‐
dard‐like features of the Gingles framework generates three main
predictions. First, the discretion afforded by standards predicts that the
rate of disagreement between Democratic and Republican appointees
should be greater under standard‐like portions of the Gingles test than
it is under rule‐like portions. Second, the greater flexibility afforded by
standards predicts that, as the changing nature of vote dilution litiga‐
tion undermined the relevance of the Gingles preconditions, judges of
both political parties would move away from their reliance on the pre‐
conditions as a nearly exclusive determinant of liability—leading to a
decline in the rate at which judges find liability warranted in the total‐
ity of the circumstances. Third, that rate should decline more sharply
over time for Democratic appointees than Republican appointees be‐
cause of the changing partisan significance of the Gingles precondi‐
tions—leading to less ideological disagreement in later years.

77 See, for example, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v Perry, 999 F2d 831
(5th Cir 1994) (en banc).
78 See, for example, Brief for the League of Women Voters of the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners (On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari), Bartlett v Strickland, No 07‐
689 (filed Dac 21, 2007) (laying out this disagreement among lower federal courts); see also
Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 637–38 (cited in note 23) (stating that
“[i]nitially, most courts . . . either assumed without deciding or . . . explicitly permitted coalition
suits under section 2,” but that “[i]n more recent decisions . . . several courts of appeals have re‐
jected coalition claims”).
79 Additional examples of the steady constriction include both the Shaw line of cases and
LULAC v. Perry, the Court’s most recent effort to elaborate on the meaning of Section 2. See Shaw v
Reno, 509 US 620 (1992); League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v Perry, 548 US 399
(5th Cir 1994). In this vein, Rick Pildes has recently argued that, “in every single districting case
receiving plenary consideration [by the Supreme Court] since Gingles . . . the Court has continu‐
ously sought, without interruption, to cabin and confine safe minority districting to a narrower
and narrower domain.” Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representa‐
tion, 68 Ohio St L J 1139, 1140–41 (2007).
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3. A Caveat.
Gingles’s sequentiality is part of what makes it possible for us to
compare how judges evaluate rules and standards. The doctrinal
framework requires judges to first analyze the rule‐like preconditions
before proceeding to the totality of the circumstances test. If Gingles
did not specify the sequence of the analysis, a judge who opposed li‐
ability might immediately proceed to the standard‐like step, conclude
that the totality of the circumstances did not merit liability, and forgo
analysis of the rule‐like step. The application of the rule‐like portion by
judges opposed to liability would not be observed. The sequencing
requirement of Gingles makes this possibility much less likely. While in
practice some judges might assume the existence of the preconditions
rather than addressing their merits, the doctrinal structure discourages
this practice, and it does not appear to be prevalent in our data.
Gingles’s doctrinal structure does have its own shortcomings, of
course. The ideal comparison of rules and standards would result from
randomizing the methods of legal judgment across judges with varying
ideological preferences. An experimenter would ask some judges to
apply a rule and others to apply a standard to identical disputes and
then compare the outcomes reached by the judges of differing ideologi‐
cal predilections under each method of judgment. The Gingles test is
not this ideal experiment, and there is some risk that our estimates
overstate the constraining force of rules.
Overstatement might arise from the sequential nature of the Gin
gles framework that makes our analysis possible. Because the first step
in the sequence is a necessary condition for liability, the full set of cases
do not reach the second stage of the Gingles analysis. Nor are the cases
reaching it a random selection of cases. The claims that fail to reach the
second stage are those that cannot satisfy the first step of Gingles. Some
of the cases that fail to satisfy the first step may be hard cases, but oth‐
ers will be easy cases—easy in the sense that that judges would agree
that liability is inappropriate. It is possible that more easy than hard
cases are screened out at the first step. If that is so, the second step of
Gingles may be marked by sharper ideological disagreements simply
because the pool of cases reaching that stage includes more difficult
cases.
Another possible source of overstatement is that the higher cost of
disfavoring liability at the first stage may encourage insincere voting in
favor of liability at that stage. If the standard‐like prong permits a
judge more discretion in arguing against liability or allows a judge to
disfavor liability at lower cost than does the rule‐like prong, a judge
opposing liability might insincerely agree that a plaintiff’s claim satis‐
fies the rule‐like prong. She would do this because she would know that
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the greater discretion of the totality of the circumstancestest is an eas‐
ier route to defeating liability. Loosely speaking, the judge might save
her ammunition for the second, standard‐like prong.83 In this account,
the degree of observed ideological disagreement under the rule‐like
prong would understate the degree of actual disagreement. But to the
extent such substitution by judges occurs, it supports our claim that the
wider discretion involved in applying a standard affords greater room
for ideological disagreement than applying a rule. Since our primary
interest is in documenting the existence of such a difference rather
than calibrating its exact magnitude, the possibility of insincere voting
actually bolsters rather than undercuts our claims.
B.

Data

We evaluate our central hypotheses using data that includes a rich
set of information about every Section 2 case decided since the Su‐
preme Court handed down its decision in Thornburg v Gingles.84 The
dataset includes all lower court dispositions, whether issued by a single
district court judge, a special three‐judge trial panel,85 or a three‐judge
appellate panel.86 To track the evolution of voting rights jurisprudence,
83 In this account, the totality of the circumstances prong in Gingles acts as a broad excep‐
tion to the set of preconditions for liability specified in the first prong. See Kaplow, 42 Duke L J at
560–61 n 5 (cited in note 49) (“When standards can be employed ex post to trump rules, the value
of rules might be significantly eroded to the extent their purpose was primarily to constrain adju‐
dicators’ discretion for fear of abuse.”). [EIO] On exceptions generally, consider Frederick Schauer,
Exceptions, 58 U Chi L Rev 871, 893–99 (1991) (characterizing legal exceptions as attributes of
power to change rules or to avoid their constraints rather than as a distinct category).
84 Detailed information on all of these opinions was initially collected by Ellen Katz and the
staff of the Voting Rights Initiative at the University of Michigan Law School. See generally Ellen
Katz, et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U Mich J L Ref 643, 643–772 (2006); Ellen D. Katz, Not Like the South?
Regional Variation and Political Participation through the Lens of Section 2, in Ana Henderson, ed,
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation and Power
183, 183–221 (Berkeley 2007) (analyzing the Voting Rights Initiative data to evaluate the statisti‐
cally significant differences in findings of liability by courts in “covered,” as opposed to “noncov‐
ered,” jurisdictions). We supplemented the Voting Rights Initiative’s initial data collection with
detailed information about every judge who adjudicated a Section 2 case—information about both
the judge’s treatment of the case and about the judge’s demographic characteristics. For a more
detailed explanation of our data collection and the construction of the dataset, see Cox and Miles,
108 Colum L Rev at 18–49 (cited in note 4).
85 Trial panels are part of the Section 2 landscape because the federal jurisdictional statute
requires that a special three‐judge district court be convened whenever a plaintiff challenges the
constitutionality of a state legislative or congressional redistricting plan. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (“A
district court of three judges shall be convened . . . when an action is filed challenging the constitu‐
tionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide
legislative body.”).
86 Because we are interested in how trial courts and appellate panels behave within a legal
framework established by the Supreme Court, we excluded en banc circuit court and Supreme
Court opinions. For more explanation about the distribution of Section 2 litigation across trial
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we focus only on decisions in which courts addressed the issue of Sec‐
tion 2 liability, rather than some preliminary or ancillary issue (such as
whether attorneys fees should be awarded or a settlement approved).
During the period covered by our dataset, courts issued 296 opinions
concerning Section 2 liability. For each decision, our dataset includes
three broad categories of information:
1. Case characteristics: this includes information about what type
of voting practice the plaintiffs challenged,87 about where the chal‐
lenged practice was located,88 and about when the challenge was
litigated.
2. Judicial demographics: this includes detailed information about
the judges deciding the case—their political affiliation (as meas‐
ured by the party of the appointing president), their race, their
age, and so forth.89
judges, trial panels, and appellate panels, see Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 9–10 (cited in
note 4).
87 The dataset groups the challenged practices into the following categories: at‐large elec‐
toral systems, redistricting plans, election administration, and other practices. A single decision
can encompass challenges to multiple types of practices. Challenges to at‐large systems and redis‐
tricting plans make up the overwhelming majority of the cases. See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L
Rev at 10–12 (cited in note 4).
88 The dataset includes two geographic variables. The first indicates whether the challenged
practice was located in the South. The second indicates whether the challenged practice was
located in a jurisdiction subject to special oversight under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
(These jurisdictions are typically called “covered” jurisdictions.) The dataset includes these vari‐
ables because, as we have discussed elsewhere, it is commonly thought that voting rights litigation
is systematically different in the South and in covered jurisdictions. See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum
L Rev at 12–13 (cited in note 4).
89 As the discussion thus far makes clear, we use party of the appointing president as a
crude proxy for political ideology. Although not reported here in order to conserve space and to
ease exposition, we have verified the robustness of our conclusions against other measures of
judicial ideology, such as common space scores. For an explanation of common space scores, see
Susan W. Johnson and Donald R. Songer, The Influence of Presidential versus Home State Senatorial
Preferences on the Policy Output of Judges on United States District Courts, 36 L & Socy Rev 657,
663–65 (2002) (describing the common space score method as one that “tak[es] the data matrix
of [congressional] roll call votes and estimate[es] legislator [and President] ideal points and roll
call outcomes that maximize the joint probability of the observed votes” in order to then extrapo‐
late them to a measure of ideology of judicial appointees) [AR]; Micheal [CQ spelling] W. Giles,
Virginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan
Selection Agendas, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 623, 631 (2001) (designating scores that account for both the
ideology of the President and the practice of senatorial courtesy) [AR]. On the appropriate meas‐
ures of ideology generally, see, for example, Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideol
ogy: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw U L Rev 743, 779–90 (2005)
(demonstrating from a study of religious freedom cases that both the common space score and the
party‐of‐the‐nominating‐president methods are largely legitimate and interchangeable proxies for
measuring judicial ideology); Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U Chi L Rev 1,
87–96 (2002) (criticizing the adoption of the party of the appointing president as a measure of a
judge’s policy preferences as invalid because “[p]residents of the same political party vary in their
ideological preferences” and are not necessarily motivated to appoint judges with the same ideol‐
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3. Doctrinal data: this includes information about whether each
judge voted for or against Section 2 liability, as well as informa‐
tion about whether and how the judge applied the Gingles frame‐
work.
This dataset for the first time makes it possible to evaluate the
way in which lower federal courts have evaluated liability under Sec‐
tion 2, as well as permitting us to trace changes in the courts’ doctrinal
treatment of Section 2 cases over time. Moreover, this assessment is
made much richer by the fact that we have judge‐level, rather than just
case‐level, information about the treatment of Section 2 claims. Thus,
when a claim is resolved by an appellate court or trial panel of three
judges, we have three data points rather than just one. This expands
our dataset from 296 judicial decisions to 588 judge votes. And be‐
cause cases are randomly assigned to judges within districts and cir‐
cuits, we are able to interpret causation as flowing from judicial charac‐
teristics to judge votes.
C.

Initial Evidence

The sections below provide summary statistics that strongly sup‐
port our central hypotheses. Part II.C.1 shows that there is considera‐
bly more ideological disagreement over the application of Gingles’s
standard‐like second step than over the application of the more rule‐
like preconditions. Part II.C.2. shows that, over time, the behavior of
Democratic and Republican appointees has converged, and their use of
the Gingles framework has changed, in exactly the way we have pre‐
dicted. Part III tests the robustness of these results using multivariate
regression analysis to control for other aspects of the cases. The re‐
gression analysis confirms the relationships we uncover in the sum‐
mary statistics.
1. Static Comparisons
Do rules constrain judges more than standards? To begin investi‐
gating this question, Table 1 reports the average rates at which Democ‐
ratic and Republican appointees vote to find either liability or particu‐
lar steps of the Gingles framework met.
ogy as their own)[AR]; Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A
Metaanalysis, 20 Just Sys J 219, 221–43 (1999) (synthesizing numerous studies and concluding
that party of the appointing president is a reasonable proxy of judicial ideology) [AR]. See also
Joshua B. Fischman, DecisionMaking under a Norm of Consensus: A Structural Analysis of Three
Judge
Panels
1
(unpublished
manuscript,[Comma
CQ]
2008),
online
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=912299 (visited July 5, 2008) (estimating ideology parameters for
judges using data from asylum and sex discrimination cases).
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TABLE 1. RATES OF VOTING IN SECTION 2 DECISIONS,
BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Party of Judge
Democrat

Republican

Difference of

(1)

(2)

(1) – (2):

(A) Votes for Section 2 Liability

.333
(.030)
[240]

.213
(.022)
[348]

(B) Votes to Apply Gingles Factors

.754
(.028)
[240]

.767
(.023)
[348]

-.013
(.036)

(C) Votes to Find Gingles Factors
Satisfied, Conditional on Factors
Discussed

.442
(.037)
[181]

.345
(.029)
[267]

.097**
(.047)

(D) Votes for Section 2 Liability,
Conditional on Finding Gingles
Factors Satisfied

.775
(.047)
[80]

.598
(.051)
[92]

.177**
(.070)

(3)
.121**
(.037)

Note: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets. * means
significant at 10 percent level. ** means significant at 5 percent level.

Row (A) of the table displays the rates at which judges of each
party voted to find liability under Section 2, and it confirms that the
partisan differences we identified in our earlier work are also evident
in the shorter, 1986–2004, period following the Gingles decision.90 The
row shows that Democratic appointees voted to assign liability about
12 percentage points more often than Republican appointees. This dif‐
ference is almost identical to the 13 percentage point difference we
observed in the longer time period of our earlier study.
The remaining rows examine the judicial treatment of the Gingles
test. Row (B) shows the rates at which these judges voted to apply the
Gingles framework. They did so at high rates—about 75 percent. This
pattern is consistent with the conventional wisdom that the Gingles test
is the centerpiece of litigation under Section 2.91 In addition, these ag‐
gregate figures reveal no sharp ideological differences in the rate at
which the judges voted to apply the Gingles test. Fewer than two per‐
centage points separate the rates at which Democratic and Republican
appointees voted to apply the test, and this difference is not statisti‐
cally significant.
In contrast, some ideological divisions are evident in the summary
statistics for the judges’ conclusions about whether the Gingles precon‐
90 See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev 18–49 (cited in note 4) (identifying substantial dif‐
ferences in the rates at which Democratic and Republican appointees voted in favor of Section 2
liability). [AR]
91 See text accompanying notes 31–34.
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ditions are satisfied. Row (C) reports the rates at which judges voted to
conclude that the plaintiff’s challenge satisfied the Gingles factors in
cases where they agreed to apply the framework. It shows that in cases
in which they voted to apply the Gingles factors, Democratic appointees
were more likely to conclude that the factors were met. The difference,
slightly less than ten percentage points, is just above the standard 5
percent significance level. This difference provides some support for
the characterization of Section 2 litigation in the academic commen‐
tary—that conclusions about the satisfaction of the Gingles factors
track conclusions about liability.
But even when judges agree that the Gingles factors are met, a
court must assess the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether an ultimate determination of liability is warranted. Row (D)
reports the average rates at which judges concluded that liability was
warranted after finding the factors satisfied. An important caveat in
considering these figures is that the number of observations is modest
because these cases are the subset in which judges have determined
both that the Gingles factors apply and its factors are met. Despite this,
two strong patterns emerge. First, Democratic and Republican appoint‐
ees differed widely in the rate at which they concluded (after deciding
that the Gingles factors were met) that the totality of the circumstances
warranted liability. Democratic appointees favored liability in this set‐
ting 78 percent of the time, while Republican appointees favored it only
60 percent. The 18 percentage point difference in these conditional
probabilities is somewhat larger in magnitude than the 12 percentage
point difference in overall liability rates seen in Row (A), and it is
nearly double the 10 percentage point difference in conditional prob‐
ability that the factors were met shown in Row (C). If taken at face
value, these comparisons suggest that the question about whether the
totality of the circumstances warrant liability is even more polarizing
than the question about whether the Gingles preconditions are satis‐
fied.
The second pattern evident in Row (D) is that, aside from the
ideological difference, judges who reach step two’s totality test are
quite likely to find a violation of Section 2. The likelihood of assigning
liability conditional on the three preconditions being met is well over
50 percent. For each set of appointees, it is more than 25 percentage
points higher than the corresponding (conditional) probability that
they found the preconditions satisfied. In other words, judges were
much more likely to render a pro‐plaintiff decision at the second stage
of the Gingles analysis than they were at the first stage. These findings
are consistent with the conventional wisdom that satisfaction of the
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Gingles factors correlates strongly with liability.92 But they also suggest
that the inquiry into the totality of the circumstances is an area of more
intense ideological division.
These findings are consistent with the idea that the relatively rule‐
like Gingles preconditions constrain judges’ decisions more than the
looser totality of the circumstances test. If the three preconditions were
more constraining, one would expect to see greater ideological dis‐
agreement in the application of the totality of the circumstances test
than in the application of the Gingles preconditions. The summary sta‐
tistics suggest just such a result, and the regression analysis below sug‐
gests that the effect is fairly pronounced. To be sure, we must be
somewhat cautious about this interpretation. Because the doctrinal test
is sequential, the selection of cases to which judges apply the three pre‐
conditions is somewhat different than the selection of cases to which
the judges apply the totality of the circumstances test. But for the rea‐
sons we explained above, we do not believe that these selection con‐
cerns undermine the central findings.
2. Comparisons over Time
Our earlier work demonstrates that the liability rate in Section 2
cases has declined dramatically over the last two decades.93 The ques‐
tion of what accounts for that decline is important for both voting
rights scholars and students of judicial behavior. Looking only at litiga‐
tion outcomes, we were previously unable to explain this pattern. But
capitalizing on the richer doctrinal data allows us to make more pro‐
gress towards understanding these changes.
As we explained above, the character of voting rights litigation
changed substantially in two the decades since Gingles. These changes
in the potential representational and partisan consequences led to two
hypotheses: that judges who found the Gingles preconditions satisfied
would become more likely to vote against liability, and that Democratic
appointees would abandon the preconditions at a higher rate than Re‐
publican appointees.
a) Overall trends. For an initial assessment of these predictions,
we first examine raw time trends in the liability rates and the rates of
Gingles application. Figure 1 shows the volume of Section 2 decisions in
the two decades following the Court’s decision in Gingles on the left
scale, as well the success rate of that litigation over time on the right
scale. (Unlike the tables that examine the data at the level of judge‐
92

See note 35 and accompanying text.
See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 4) (describing the declines in
the rate of plaintiff success).
93
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votes, Figure 1 analyzes the data at the level of case outcomes.) The
number of Section 2 decisions rises in the early part of each decade,
which is consistent with a flurry of redistricting litigation following the
decennial censuses. As we have previously reported, the rate of plain‐
tiff success is marked by a sharp downward trend during the late
1980s and early 1990s.99 In the decade between 1986 and 1995, the
rate of plaintiff success declined by more than 20 percentage points.
Since the mid‐1990s, the liability rate has exhibited more stability, but
it has remained at levels far below its previous highs. Except for a brief
uptick from 1998 to 2000, the rate of plaintiff success has been flat or
slightly declining since 1997.
Has the doctrinal approach taken by courts remained constant as
liability rates declined? The remaining trend lines in Figure 1 provide
partial answers to this question. The rate at which courts have applied
the Gingles framework has remained high and relatively stable. The
figure shows that federal courts immediately accepted the framework
the Supreme Court articulated in Gingles and have readily applied it in
the vast majority of cases brought under Section 2. Except for a slight
decline after 2000, the rate at which courts applied the framework
hovered between 70 percent and 80 percent.

99

Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 4).
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FIGURE 1. LITIGATION TIME TRENDS

In contrast, the rate at which courts found the Gingles factors satis‐
fied fluctuated widely during the observation period. The movements
can be separated into two periods: first, a period of sharp decline, and
then, a period of stability. The steep decline in the late 1980s and early
1990s resulted in a roughly 25 percentage point reduction in the likeli‐
hood that the average court found the factors satisfied. But these de‐
clines mirrored the fall in liability with the result that, when judges
found the Gingles conditions met, they voted in favor of liability at least
two‐thirds of the time. Thus, the factors were central to courts’ assess‐
ments of Section 2 challenges in the first years after the decision.
Since the mid‐1990s, the rate at which courts have found the fac‐
tors satisfied has remained relatively steady but low. In addition, even
when courts have found that a challenge satisfied the factors, they less
often reached a conclusion that the election practice violated Section 2.
In effect, the Gingles factors become somewhat unmoored from liability
determinations during this period. Unlike the earlier years, during
which liability almost always followed from satisfaction of the factors,
the later period more frequently witnessed courts concluding that the
factors were met but that the challenged election practices did not vio‐
late Section 2.
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These patterns are consistent with the first prediction about the
impact of the changing nature of Section 2 litigation. Earlier cases typi‐
cally involved multimember districts. In contrast, more recent Section
2 challenges emphasized changing the number of majority‐minority
districts and were more likely to involve areas of the South where ra‐
cial polarization had declined. These changes in the nature of Section 2
claims made liability less likely for two reasons. First, the more recent
challenges were less likely to satisfy the Gingles preconditions, and
without satisfaction of the first stage of the doctrinal framework, these
claims could not advance to liability. Second even when court con‐
cluded that the Gingles factors were met, the different representational
consequences of these cases made it less likely that court would con‐
clude that the totality of the circumstances warranted liability.100 The
widening gap between the rates at which the factors were met and li‐
ability suggests a greater hesitancy to let liability follow immediately
from the meeting of the factors. The raw overall trends therefore are
consistent with for the first prediction about the effect of the evolving
nature of Section 2 challenges.
b) Partisan trends. For an initial assessment of the second predic‐
tion—that Democratic appointees became less likely over time to con‐
clude that liability should follow immediately from satisfaction of the
Gingles factors—we turn from the case‐level analysis in Figure 1 back
to a judge‐vote level analysis. Table 2 displays the rates at which De‐
mocratic and Republican appointees favored voting rights plaintiffs at
each step of the Gingles framework, and it breaks these comparisons
into two periods, before and after 1994. The year 1994 was chosen
because it was roughly the midpoint of the observation period, and
thus, the comparisons give a sense of the time trends in judges’ applica‐
tions of Gingles.101

100 See notes 37–47 and accompanying text (explaining the changing representational and
political consequences of vote dilution litigation over this period); notes 71–75 (setting out the
hypotheses that flow from the changes in the nature of Section 2 litigation).
101 We also chose this breakpoint [CQ] because it is the one we used for all two‐period com‐
parisons in our earlier work. See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 23 n 78 (cited in note 4).
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TABLE 2. RATES OF VOTING IN THE GINGLES FRAMEWORK,
BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Gingles Factors
Discussed
(1)

(2)

(3)

.768
(.038)
[125]

.376
(.486)
[125]

.915
(.041)
[47]

Republican

.709
(.037)
[151]

.258
(.036)
[151]

.667
(.076)
[39]

Democrat - Republican

.059
(.053)

.118**
(.156)

.248**
(.083)

Democrat

.739
(.041)
[115]

.287
(.042)
[115]

.576
(.054)
[33]

Republican

.812
(.028)
[197]

.269
(.032)
[197]

.547
(.069)
[53]

Democrat - Republican

-.073
(.048)

.018
(.053)

.029
(.111)

Before 1994 Democrat

After 1994

Gingles Factors Liability, Conditional
Met, Conditional on on Gingles Factors
Factors Discussed
Met

Note: Table provides means, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations in brackets. * means
significant at 10 percent level. ** means significant at 5 percent level.

Column (1) reports the rate at which judges concluded that the
Gingles framework should be applied. As seen in Figure 1, both groups
of judges applied the framework at high rates, between 70 percent and
80 percent of the time. In each time period, Democratic and Republican
appointees generally agreed that the Gingles framework was appropri‐
ate. Before 1994, the Democratic appointees applied it at a rate only 6
percentage points higher than Republican appointees did, and after
1994, they applied it at a rate only 7 percentage points lower than Re‐
publicans did. Neither of these differences were statistically significant.
The movement in these rates is due almost entirely to an increase in
the willingness of Republican appointees to apply the doctrinal frame‐
work. The rate at which Republican appointees voted to apply it rose
by 10 percentage points, from 71 percent to 82 percent, between the
two time periods. These data cannot reveal whether this increase is
due to a greater acceptance by Republican appointees of the appropri‐
ateness of the Gingles framework, to a conclusion by Republican ap‐
pointees over time that application of Gingles might advance their own
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party’s interests, or some combination of the two.102 But the primary
conclusion from Column (1) is that judges widely accepted Gingles as
the organizing framework for voting rights claims. Judges of both po‐
litical affiliations voted at very high rates to apply Gingles throughout
the observation period.
Columns (2) and (3) show the rates of ideological disagreement at
each step in the Gingles analysis. In these columns, more pronounced
differences between the two groups of judges are evident in the earlier
time period, and these differences vanish in the later period. In the
1989–94 period, Democratic appointees were more likely than their
Republican counterparts to find the Gingles factors met, and condi‐
tional on having found the factors met, they were much more likely to
conclude that the challenged electoral practice violated Section 2. They
concluded 38 percent of the time that the Gingles preconditions were
met while Republican appointees did so only 26 percent of the time.
The 12 percentage point difference between these figures is statisti‐
cally significant.
The totality of the circumstances test featured an even larger de‐
gree of ideological disagreement in the earlier period. Column (3) re‐
ports the rate at which judges voted to assign liability conditional on
those factors being met, and in the 1989–1994 period, the analysis of
this prong featured the largest difference between Democratic and Re‐
publican appointees. When the average Democratic appointee deter‐
mined the Gingles factors were met, she was almost certain to vote in
favor of liability: after concluding that a challenge satisfied the
preconditions, Democratic judges favored liability fully 92 percent of
the time in the years prior to 1994. The corresponding rate for
Republican appointees was also relatively high at 67 percent, and the
difference between them of nearly 25 percentage points is statistically
significant.
The results for the 1989–1994 period provide further support for
the static hypothesis about the degree of discretion afforded judges
under standards versus rules. The difference in the rates at which De‐
mocratic and Republican appointees favored voting rights plaintiffs
under the second prong of the Gingles framework was more than dou‐
102 The opinions in Thornburg v Gingles make it somewhat unsurprising that Republican
appointees were initially more reluctant to apply the Gingles framework to vote dilution chal‐
lenges. The framework was crafted by Justice Brennan, one of the Court’s most liberal members.
See 478 US[FC at n 2.] at 34. In a separate opinion, the considerably more conservative Justice
O’Connor rejected Justice Brennan’s framework as misguided. See 478 US[FC at n 2.] at 90–93
(O’Connor concurring in the judgment) (complaining that under the Court’s framework, “electoral
success has [ ] emerged . . . as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and that the elements of a vote
dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly proportional representation within the framework
of single‐member districts.”).[37 wds.]
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ble the difference under the first prong. The larger gap in the second,
standard‐like prong of Gingles is consistent with the prediction that
ideological disagreements will be more intense under standards than
rules.
Importantly, however, this basic partisan division in the evalua‐
tion of the totality of the circumstances in the years immediately fol‐
lowing Gingles did not hold up over time. During the years after 1994,
Democratic appointees look nearly like Republican appointees at both
steps of the framework. Column (2) shows that the rate at which De‐
mocratic appointees concluded that the rule‐like preconditions were
satisfied fell by nine percentage points, from 38 percent to 29 percent.
In contrast, the corresponding rate for Republicans rose by a mere one
percentage point, from 26 percent to 27 percent. The sizable ideologi‐
cal difference in how judges evaluated this prong during the earlier
period all but disappeared in the later period. In the years after 1994,
there was no meaningful difference in the rate at which Democratic and
Republican appointees favored voting rights plaintiffs at the first stage
of Gingles.
Column (3) shows that the evaluation of whether the totality of the
circumstances warranted liability featured an even more substantial
convergence. In both time periods, Republican appointees have always
denied liability under the totality inquiry in a substantial fraction of
cases. In cases where Republican appointees found the Gingles precon‐
ditions satisfied, they voted in favor of liability only about 67 percent of
the time before 1994. This fraction fell somewhat over time, indicating
that, for these judges, the significance of the Gingles preconditions
waned. But the decline was modest: the likelihood that a Republican
appointee voted in favor of liability after finding the preconditions met
fell only by about 10 percentage points between the earlier and later
period.
The rate at which Democratic appointees concluded that the total‐
ity of the circumstances required liability after finding the precondi‐
tions met fell much more sharply. In the first half of the observation
period, Democratic appointees favored liability 92 percent of the time
after concluding the factors were met. In the second half of the time
period, they favored it only 58 percent of the time. The rate at which
they concluded the totality of the circumstances favored liability thus
fell by 34 percentage points. Although the number of votes by Democ‐
ratic appointees in this prong of the framework is small, the decline is
quite large and statistically significant.
To put this differently, these figures imply that Democratic and
Republican appointees favored voting rights plaintiffs under both the
first and the second prongs at roughly the same rate in later years. Af‐
ter 1994, the average Democratic appointee who found the precondi‐
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tions met voted for liability 58 percent of the time, while Republican
appointees did so 55 percent of the time—a nearly identical treatment
that stands in sharp contrast to the gap of almost 25 percentage points
separating these groups of judges prior to 1994. These raw changes are
consistent with our second hypothesis regarding the inflexibility of
rules to social change—that, as the partisan and representational con‐
sequences of vote dilution litigation changed, the rate at which judges
found liability was warranted in the totality of the circumstances
should decline more quickly for Democratic appointees than Republi‐
can appointees.
c) Preliminary Conclusions. In short, these data point to a second
transformation of voting rights litigation. As the data show, the 1982
amendments and the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretation of
them did initially make Gingles’s three preconditions test the central
doctrinal tool around which Section 2 litigation was organized. But
within a decade a second transformation dramatically undermined the
significance of Gingles. Two doctrinal shifts propelled this transforma‐
tion. First, judges moved sharply away from the view that satisfaction
of the Gingles preconditions was essentially sufficient to establish li‐
ability. In the early years following Gingles, courts that found the pre‐
conditions satisfied overwhelmingly concluded that liability existed.
More recently, however, the connection between the preconditions and
liability has grown much more tenuous. While courts continued to in‐
sist that finding the Gingles preconditions satisfied would almost inevi‐
tably lead to liability,103 the actual practice of courts belied this rhetoric.
Second, the behavior of Democratic and Republican appointees has
converged over time. In fact, the declining significance of the Gingles
preconditions appears to be largely the product of changes in the vot‐
ing patterns of Democratic appointees. These judges have come, over
time, to look much more like Republican appointees in their skepticism
of the significance of the Gingles preconditions.
This finding is quite significant for our understanding of the role
that federal courts play in promoting minority voting rights. Other vot‐
ing rights scholars, perhaps most notably Richard Pildes, have sug‐
gested that federal courts adapt quickly to changing social conditions in
voting rights litigation.104 Our findings provide some empirical support
for his argument. But our data suggest a different sort of response than
that predicted by most voting rights literature. The literature focuses
principally on the implications of social change for the substantive con‐
103

See note 34 and accompanying text.
See Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1567–73 (cited in note 40). Compare Richard H. Pildes, The
Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 Ohio St L J 1139, 1141–42, 1158–60
(2007).
104
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tent of the Gingles test itself.105 This focus is understandable, particu‐
larly in light of the fact that courts continue to claim that the test itself
is so centrally important. But stepping back from judicial rhetoric and
focusing instead on judicial practice reveals a very different pattern.
Courts have responded to changing litigation and political realities not
just by tweaking the Gingles test, but by moving substantially away
from that famous test as an important determinant of liability under
the Voting Rights Act.
III. CONFIRMING THE HYPOTHESES
To be sure that the patterns we observe in the raw data are ro‐
bust—that is, they are not actually the product of some other charac‐
teristics of Section 2 litigation—we turn in this section to regression
analysis.106 In so doing, we acknowledge that untangling the precise
causes of the transformation in voting rights adjudication is no easy
task. In part, this is because the jurisprudential features on which we
have focused are not exogenous attributes of the cases. The doctrinal
approach and analysis arise endogenously from each judge’s resolution
of a particular case. In other words, we have no objective measure of
whether the Gingles preconditions were met in any particular case; we
have only a judge’s conclusion that they were or were not satisfied. We
are also alert to the difficulty of distinguishing empirically between two
possible reasons for the declining significance of the Gingles framework
and the convergence of Democratic and Republican appointees: first,
that the nature of litigated cases (which includes the underlying social
conditions) changed in some important way over time; second, that
litigated cases remained unchanged but that judge’s views about mi‐
nority vote dilution litigation changed nonetheless.107 Still, the patterns
105 See Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1141–42, 1158–60 (cited in note 104); Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at
1567–73 (cited in note 40).
106 We estimated the probability that judge votes in favor of a plaintiff with probit regres‐
sions in the form Pr(Voteijct) = Demj + Zjt + Xijct + αc + αt + εijct. The dependent variable Pr(Voteijct)
represents the probability that judge j in case i in year t and circuit c votes for the plaintiff. The
dependent variable in some specifications is the likelihood of voting in favor of Section 2 liability,
and in others, it is the likelihood of voting in favor of satisfaction of the Gingles factors. In these
equations, Demj is a binary variable taking the value one when a Democratic president appointed
judge j and zero otherwise. The term Xijct reflects variables that are specific to case i, and Zjt con‐
tains variables reflecting characteristics of judge j, some of which may vary over time. The binary
variables αc and αt are fixed effects for circuit c and year t. The term εijct is an error term. Standard
errors are clustered on cases because the votes of judges sitting on the same panel may not be
independent.
107 The views of judges could have changed because of ideological drift or because of genera‐
tional replacement on the courts. A third possibility is that judges’ views changed because they
acquired new information over time about the consequences of vote dilution litigation. But we
believe that it is more appropriate to characterize changes in information as changes in case com‐
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in the data are consistent with a fairly conventional account about
some substantial changes in the nature of vote dilution litigation that
took place over the past two decades.108
Table 3 presents the first set of regression results.109 The depend‐
ent variable in these equations is the probability that a judge votes in
favor of assigning liability under Section 2. These equations confirm
that the findings we previously obtained regarding the relationship
between the liability and judicial characteristics in the entire period
since the 1982 Amendments persist in the post‐Gingles period.110 The
results in the subsequent tables present analyses of the doctrinal fac‐
tors.
Table 4 reports equations in which the dependent variable is the
probability a judge decides the Gingles factors are satisfied, and in
these regressions the data are limited to those observations in which
judges voted to apply the Gingles framework. These equations estimate
the first step of the Gingles analysis: the probability a judge concludes
the Gingles factors are met, conditional on the judge having favored
applying the framework.
Table 5 presents similar equations for the second stage of the Gin
gles framework, the totality of the circumstances. In these equations,
the dependent variable is the probability a judge votes to assign liabil‐
ity under Section 2, and here, the data are limited to those observations
in which judges decided that the case satisfied the Gingles factors.
These equations estimate the probability a judge favors liability, condi‐

position. Analytically, this more cleanly separates “internal” accounts of the change in judicial
behavior from “external” accounts.
Also, as we noted above, we should emphasize that our results remain largely the same
when we employ alternative measures of judicial ideology that are somewhat less crude than the
party‐of‐the‐appointing‐President measure. See supra note __. The robustness of the results to
alternative ideological proxies lessens the likelihood that the results are driven by generational
replacement that changed the ideological composition of the judiciary. Thus, while it might be
tempting to think that the post‐1994 changes are driven by Clinton’s judicial appointments being
more conservative than earlier Democratic appointees, we find no significant evidence of this
possibility.
108 See notes 39–47 and accompanying text (summarizing this conventional account).
109 To make it easier to interpret our results, the regression results in Tables 3 through 5
show the marginal effects for each explanatory variable instead of the regression coefficients. This
simply means that the numbers listed in these tables reflect percentage changes in the likelihood
of a judge finding liability. To see this, consider for example the first row of Table 3. This row
shows how much more likely a judge was to vote in favor of liability if the “Judge Was Democratic
Appointee.” Under our first regression (in Column (1)), the marginal effect is .109, which means
that a judge was more likely to vote in favor of liability by 10.9 percentage points on average if she
is a Democrat rather than a Republican.
110 See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 18–49 (cited in note 4). Briefly, the estimates in
the shorter time period are quite similar to the earlier results, and our central conclusions are
unchanged.
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tional on the judge having concluded that the challenge met the Gingles
factors.
Each of these tables presents four regression specifications. Col‐
umn (1) displays the baseline estimates in which judicial ideology and
race are the parameters of primary interest. The regression in column
(2) adds controls for the partisan and racial composition of the panel.
Columns (3) and (4) present regression specifications that track Col‐
umns (1) and (2) respectively – except that this second pair includes a
term interacting a judge’s partisan affiliation with the time period.
To ease the exposition of the results, we organize the discussion
around the parameters of interest rather than the equations.
TABLE 3. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING
FOR SECTION 2 LIABILITY: PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.109**
(.036)

.105**
(.038)

.114**
(.047)

.129**
(.049)

Judge Was Democratic Appointee * Year Was
After 1994

--

--

-.048
(.055)

-.048
(.052)

One Additional Democratic Appointee on Panel

--

.057
(.041)

--

.055
(.041)

Two Additional Democratic Appointees on Panel

--

.114
(.088)

--

.113
(.088)

.269**
(.084)

.335**
(.094)

.269**
(.085)

.333**
(.094)

--

.282**
(.105)

--

.284**
(.105)

-.112**
(.045)

-.177**
(.056)

-.115**
(.046)

-.179**
(.056)

Challenge to At Large Election

.062
(.055)

.071
(.057)

.061
(.055)

.070
(.057)

Challenge to Reapportionment Plan

.033
(.061)

.009
(.061)

.033
(.062)

.009
(.061)

Challenge to Local Election Practice

.006
(.051)

.036
(.050)

.008
(.051)

.037
(.050)

Plaintiffs Were African-American

.051
(.056)

.052
(.055)

.052
(.056)

.052
(.055)

Case Occurred in Jurisdiction Covered by § 5

.055
(.060)

.036
(.061)

.054
(.060)

.035
(.061)

-285.840

-274.841

-285.548

-274.551

.1546

.1872

.1555

.1880

Judge Was Democratic Appointee

Judge was African-American
Additional African-American on Panel
Appellate Case

Log-likelihood
Pseudo- R

2

Note: Estimated marginal effects and in parentheses standard errors. * means significant at 10 percent level. **
means significant at 5 percent level. N=588. All regressions also include fixed‐effect controls for judicial circuits
and years.
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Judicial Ideology

The results of Table 3 show that, consistent with our earlier analy‐
sis, judicial ideology exerts a sizable and robust effect on the likelihood
a judge votes to assign liability in Section 2 challenges. The magnitude
of the impact in columns (1) and (2), about 10 percentage points, is
similar to our previous findings, and it is very close to the difference
observed in the summary statistics of Table 1.
Columns (3) and (4) include interactions of judicial ideology and
time period. That interaction captures any change over time in the be‐
havior of Democratic appointees relative to Republican appointees. It
therefore allows us to test whether the ideological convergence that
shows up in the summary statistics remains after we control for other
determinants of liability. The estimates in column (3), for example, im‐
ply that the average rate at which a Democratic appointee in the years
prior to 1994 voted in favor of Section 2 liability was 11.4 percentage
points higher than that of the average Republican appointee. In the
years after 1994, this difference shrinks to 6.6 percentage points (.066
= .114 – .048). Although the point estimates imply that, even after
1994, Democratic appointees are more likely to vote in favor of liabil‐
ity, the imprecision of the estimates implies that this 6.6 percentage
point difference is not distinguishable from zero at conventional sig‐
nificance levels (p‐value = .1891).
The equations in columns (2) and (4) in Table 3 include control
variables for the partisan composition of the panel, for those judges
who sit in panels. Because some of our observations come from Circuit
panels and special trial panels, these variables are needed to control for
the “indirect effects” or “panel effects” of partisanship. Numerous re‐
searchers have found evidence that the ideology of other judges on a
panel can influence a judge’s decisionmaking. This research typically
shows that Republican or conservative judges are more likely to cast
liberal votes when they sit on panels with Democratic or liberal judges.
Conversely, it indicates that Democratic or liberal judges are more
likely to cast conservative votes when they sit with Republican or con‐
servative judges.111 The estimates in columns (2) and (4) provide weak
111 See, for example, Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U Chi L Rev 761, 767–68 (2008) (finding ideological voting panel effects in cases of
hard look review of EPA and NLRB decision in the Courts of Appeals); Thomas J. Miles and Cass R.
Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev
823, 851–65 (2006) (same in Chevron review cases); Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?
An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary 17–45 (Brookings 2006) (demonstrating “substan‐
tial” panel effects in judicial voting as expressed through “ideological dampening and ideological
amplification” across a wide variety of types of cases); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa
M. Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev
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support for the presence of panel effects in liability determinations.
The point estimates for the individual panel effects are not statistically
significant. But they imply that, as Democratic appointees comprise a
greater share of the panel, the likelihood that a judge votes in favor of
the plaintiff rises. For example, the results in column (2) indicate that
the probability that a Republican appointee votes in favor of liability
rises by 5.7 percentage points when she sits with one Democratic ap‐
pointee and by 11.4 percentage points when she sits with two.112

301, 311–30 (2004) (same); Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S.
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J L, Econ, & Org 299,
312–21 (2004) (finding panel effects based on gender and ideology in employment discrimination
suits); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va L Rev
1717, 1719 (1997) (finding that “a judge’s vote . . . is greatly affected by the identity of the other
judges sitting on the panel” and that “the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a
greater bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”).
112 For a more extensive discussion of the role that panel effects play in Section 2 cases, see
Cox & Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 25–29, 40–42.
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TABLE 4. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING TO FIND
GINGLES FACTORS MET, CONDITIONAL ON APPLYING THEM:
PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.076
(.054)

.079
(.061)

.093
(.078)

.103
(.082)

Judge Was Democratic Appointee * Year Was
After 1994

--

--

-.033
(.101)

-.037
(.103)

One Additional Democratic Appointee on Panel

--

-.038
(.071)

--

-.031
(.074)

Two Additional Democratic Appointees on Panel

--

-.114
(.117)

--

-.100
(.123)

.214**
(.090)

.259**
(.108)

.213**
(.090)

.329**
(.110)

--

.253**
(.0128)

--

.312**
(.128)

Appellate Case

-.023
(.076)

-.024
(.090)

-.024
(.076)

-.026
(.092)

Challenge to At Large Election

.112
(.126)

.112
(.127)

.111
(.126)

.127
(.126)

Challenge to Reapportionment Plan

.150
(.136)

.130
(.136)

.149
(.136)

.132
(.135)

Challenge to Local Election Practice

-.020
(.093)

-.025
(.103)

-.019
(.093)

-.019
(.104)

Plaintiffs Were African-American

.216**
(.088)

.210**
(.089)

.217**
(.088)

.263**
(.088)

Case Occurred in Jurisdiction Covered by § 5

.016
(.104)

-.005
(.103)

.013
(.104)

-.006
(.105)

-249.294

-245.529

-249.245

-240.582

.1644

.1770

.1242

.1883

Judge Was Democratic Appointee

Judge was African-American
Additional African-American on Panel

Log-likelihood
Pseudo- R

2

Note: Estimated marginal effects and in parentheses standard errors. * means significant at 10 percent level. **
means significant at 5 percent level. N=448. All regressions also include fixed‐effect controls for judicial circuits
and years.

The regressions in Table 4 shift focus to the role of ideology at first
step of Gingles. They show that judicial ideology plays a weaker role at
this first step than it does with respect to ultimate votes for or against
liability. In those cases where the framework is applied, the first two
Columns demonstrate that a Democratic appointee is about eight per‐
centage points more likely than a Republican appointee to vote in favor
of finding the Gingles factors met. In addition to their smaller implied
magnitudes, these estimates are slightly less precisely estimated than
the liability estimates in Table 3. Consequently, these estimates are not
statistically significant. The last two equations in Table 4 attempt to
capture changes over time in the role that judicial ideology plays in the
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application of the Gingles preconditions. They indicate an even smaller
difference existed between Democratic and Republican appointees af‐
ter 1994. Column (3), for example, implies that the difference in the
rates at which Democratic and Republican appointees find liability has
decreased by six percentage points (.06 = .093 ‐ .033). An additional
reason to doubt that ideology has a meaningful effect on a judge’s deci‐
sion regarding the satisfaction of the Gingles factors is that the esti‐
mated effects of panel composition are negative here and statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
These estimates provide some support for the conclusion that ju‐
dicial ideology exerts a more muted influence in the evaluation of the
Gingles factors than it does on the overall liability determination. In
that regard, the results are consistent with the view that the specific
focus of the Gingles prongs and their more rule‐like structure affords
less opportunity for judicial ideology to assert itself.
The estimates in Table 4 contrast sharply with those in Table 5.
Table 5 focuses on Gingles’s second step. This Table shows that judicial
ideology correlates strongly and significantly with the probability a
judge votes to assign liability after concluding that the Gingles factors
are satisfied. Ideology’s impact on this probability operates both di‐
rectly, through a judge’s own political affiliation, and indirectly,
through the partisan composition of a judge’s panel colleagues. For
example, the estimates of column (1) of Table 5 show that the probabil‐
ity the average Democratic appointee concludes that liability should
follow from satisfaction of the factors is 15.2 percentage points higher
than that of the average Republican appointee. When controls for panel
composition are included, as in the regression in column (2), this esti‐
mated difference is 20.5 percentage points. Moreover, the effects of
panel composition are as large as the impact of a judge’s own ideology.
The equation in column (2) implies that the presence of any additional
Democratic appointee on a panel raises by 22 percentage points the
probability that the judge concludes liability should follow from satis‐
faction of the factors. All of these estimates are statistically significant.
These regressions indicate that, after controlling for other characteris‐
tics of the cases, judicial ideology has a strong influence on the evalua‐
tion of whether, in the totality of the circumstances, liability should
follow from the plaintiff’s satisfying the Gingles factors.
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TABLE 5. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIVIDUAL JUDGES VOTING
FOR SECTION 2 LIABILITY, CONDITIONAL ON
GINGLES FACTORS BEING MET: PROBIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.152*
(.086)

.205**
(.096)

.386**
(.123)

.403**
(.102)

Judge Was Democratic Appointee * Year Was
After 1994

--

--

-.570**
(.196)

-.537**
(.180)

One Additional Democratic Appointee on Panel

--

.223**
(.092)

--

.202**
(.090)

Two Additional Democratic Appointees on Panel

--

.222**
(.065)

--

.199**
(.061)

.161
(.094)

.204**
(.065)

.131
(.094)

.163*
(.063)

--

.201*
(.066)

--

.173
(.064)

Appellate Case

-.109
(.106)

-.291**
(.116)

-.086
(.103)

-.256**
(.112)

Challenge to At Large Election

.326
(.227)

.259
(.211)

.288
(.249)

.186
(.226)

Challenge to Reapportionment Plan

-.107
(.185)

-.186
(.162)

-.050
(.197)

-.157
(.177)

Challenge to Local Election Practice

.160
(.132)

.360**
(.168)

.266**
(.140)

.425**
(.166)

Plaintiffs Were African-American

.317
(.241)

.281
(.250)

.302
(.239)

.270
(.242)

Case Occurred in Jurisdiction Covered by § 5

.220*
(.090)

.215*
(.083)

.249**
(.078)

.236**
(.071)

-61.509

-54.730

-57.721

-51.656

.4294

.4923

.4645

.5208

Judge Was Democratic Appointee

Judge was African-American
Additional African-American on Panel

Log-likelihood
Pseudo- R

2

Note: Estimated marginal effects and in parentheses standard errors. * means significant at 10 percent level. **
means significant at 5 percent level. N=172. All regressions also include fixed‐effect controls for judicial circuits
and years.

Table 5 also shows that the role of judicial ideology at the totality –
of‐the‐circumstances stage changed dramatically over time. The equa‐
tions in columns (3) and (4) present tests for differential trends in the
effect of judicial ideology. When the regression includes an interaction
of a judge’s partisan affiliation and time period, the baseline estimate of
ideology remains substantial. For example, the results in column (3)
imply that, prior to 1994, a Democratic appointee had a conditional
probability of voting in favor of liability that was 38.6 percentage
points higher on average than a Republican appointee. But after 1994,
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the estimated effect of ideology swung back, even into negative terri‐
tory (‐.184 = .386 – .570).
Without attaching too much importance to the precise magnitudes
of these estimates, the general patterns are clear. Before 1994, Democ‐
ratic appointment correlated strongly with a higher conditional prob‐
ability of favoring liability once a plaintiff satisfied the Gingles precon‐
ditions. After 1994, there was no statistically significant difference be‐
tween Democratic and Republican appointees in this conditional prob‐
ability (p‐value = .4059). The regression analysis provides some con‐
firmation of the patterns seen in Table 2. Democratic appointees were
initially more likely to conclude that liability should follow from a
plaintiff’s satisfaction of the factors. But by the latter half of the 1990s,
they were no more willing to assign liability in this circumstance than
were Republican appointees.
In short, these models confirm that ideology correlates with liabil‐
ity under Section 2; that there are only modest partisan differences in
the likelihood that Democratic and Republican appointees will find the
Gingles factors satisfied; and that ideology correlates much more
strongly with the question of whether liability should follow from satis‐
faction of the factors. Panel effects of ideology are most clearly appar‐
ent during the evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.
Moreover, the models confirm that there were sharp changes over
time in the role that judicial ideology played in the second stage of the
Gingles inquiry. In the first half of the observation period, the probabil‐
ity that a Democratic appointee concluded that liability should follow
from satisfaction of the Gingles preconditions is much higher on aver‐
age than that of a Republican. But in the second half of the study period,
this conditional probability for the average Democratic appointee was
statistically indistinguishable from that of the average Republican ap‐
pointee. This trend is consistent with the hypotheses we laid out in Part
II about the possible changes over time in the representational and
political consequences of voting rights litigation.
B.

Other Characteristics
1. Judicial race.

In addition to its political salience, the Voting Rights Act—as a
statute intended to protect minority voting rights—also has particular
relevance to the dimension of race. For that reason, we previously in‐
vestigated the role of a judge’s race on the likelihood that the judge will
impose liability under Section 2.113 Although the number of African‐
113

See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 29–37, 42–45 (cited in note 4).
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American judges in the data was small, the magnitude of the effects we
detected was quite large. We observed that African‐American judges
were substantially more likely to vote in favor of a Section 2 plaintiff. In
addition, race exerted a sizable panel effect. White judges who sat on
panels with at least one African‐American judge were considerably
more likely to vote in favor of liability, and this effect was evident for
both Democratic and Republican appointees. The results in Table 3
confirm these patterns persist in the shorter time period studied here.
Table 4 shows that similar patterns exist between race and the
conditional probability a judge concludes the Gingles factors are met.
The estimates for the direct and peer effect of race are large—over 20
percentage points. Again, the small number of African‐American judges
in the data may result in a few outliers driving the estimates. But the
general pattern is remarkable in view of the muted effect of ideology in
judicial assessments of whether the plaintiff has satisfied the Gingles
factors.
In Table 5, the regressions indicate that a judge’s race also influ‐
ences the conditional probability that she determines that liability fol‐
lows from the preconditions’ satisfaction. Caution is warranted here
because the number of observations of African‐American judges in this
subsample is quite small: there are only 19. Despite this limitation, it is
remarkable that the race of the judge appears to correlate just as
strongly with the likelihood that the judge determines the totality of
the circumstances warrants liability as it does with the overall prob‐
ability that the judge votes for liability.
2. Case characteristics.
The regressions control for a variety of case characteristics. Par‐
ticular caution is warranted in interpreting these estimates because,
unlike judicial characteristics, case characteristics are not the products
of randomization. Rather, they are the result of litigant self‐selection
and are therefore likely correlated with the error term.114 With this ca‐
veat in mind, the estimates for these features of the cases warrant brief
discussion.
The type of court correlates with the probability of liability and in
some specifications with the likelihood that liability follows from a
plaintiff’s satisfaction of the factors. The regressions in Table 3 show a
pattern similar to our previous findings—that judges sitting on appel‐
114 See Cox and Miles, Documenting Discrimination?, 108 Colum L Rev Sidebar 23 (2008),
available at http://www.clrsidebar.org/replies/Cox_Miles_Documenting (explaining the methodo‐
logical problem with drawing strong inferences from the liability patterns associated with these
case characteristics) .
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late courts voted to assign liability at rates about 10 to 18 percentage
points lower than their colleagues on trial courts. In Table 5, appellate
courts appear correlated with lower rates of liability conditional on the
factors having been met when the regression includes controls for
panel compositions. In contrast, the type of court appears unrelated to
the probability of a judge concluding that the factors are satisfied. The
results in Table 4 show that the differences between court types are
fewer than three percentage points and statistically insignificant.
CONCLUSION
Debates about the relationship between rules and standards are as
old as law itself. While there is no shortage of theory about the advan‐
tages and disadvantages of each, empirical work on the relationship
between the two has been lacking. Our findings provide support for
two of the central theoretical intuitions about rules and standards.
First, they indicate that rules indeed may, to a greater extent than stan‐
dards, limit discretion and suppress ideological disagreements among
judges. Second, they suggest that the flexibility preserved by standards
may make it easier for adjudicators to respond to changing circum‐
stances over time.
These findings have important implications for the long‐standing
debate about whether (and how) legal rules actually constrain judges.
But our results also lead to a number of specific insights about the op‐
eration of the Voting Rights Act and the protection of minority voting
rights. The doctrinal structure that Justice Brennan created in Gingles
may well have been intended to encourage judicial intervention in the
wake of Congress’s amendments to Section 2. By establishing a set of
relatively objective preconditions to liability, Brennan gave lower
courts a steadier foothold for liability findings. Nonetheless, as these
preconditions over time became a potential threat to substantive mi‐
nority representation and the Democratic party, Brennan’s two‐stage
analytic framework became more meaningful as a safety valve against
liability than a spur to it. This safety valve may have allowed courts to
respond more easily to changing social conditions and political conse‐
quences. But the cost has been the growing irrelevance of the Gingles
preconditions themselves. Today the preconditions are surprisingly
disconnected from the liability determination. Liability follows from a
finding that the preconditions are satisfied only slightly more often
than it would follow from a coin flip.
All this suggests that the Supreme Court’s effort to provide an ob‐
jective test for identifying minority vote dilution has been largely un‐
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successful.115 The lack of success is important for ongoing debates
about the structure of the Voting Rights Act. Recently, both Congress
and the Supreme Court have confronted legal issues relating to how
rule‐like the Act should be. In 2006, Congress amended Section 5 of the
Act to make more rigid the test for measuring minority political oppor‐
tunity.116 Similar changes may soon follow for Section 2. A case cur‐
rently pending before the Supreme Court raises the question of
whether prong 1 of the Gingles preconditions (which requires minority
voters be “sufficiently numerous” in the area where they claim a viola‐
tion) should be made even more rule‐like—by requiring minority vot‐
ers to constitute at least 50 percent of the voting age population of the
district whose creation they seek under Section 2.117 Our results show
that these changes might help suppress ideological disagreements
among judges, even if these disagreements continue to beset the public
conversation about voting rights. But to the extent changes to Section 2
or Section 5 do cabin ideological disagreements, they may also make it
more difficult for lower courts to adjust the Act to changing social con‐
ditions.118
115 This transformation also suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v De
Grandy may be more consequential than is often recognized. See 512 US 997 (1994). Superficially,
the case simply clarifies that the Gingles factors are necessary but not sufficient preconditions to
liability. See id at 1011–12. In light of our evidence, however, one might read the Court’s decision
in De Grandy as an important indication of the Court’s own understanding of the growing discon‐
nect between the Gingles preconditions and minority vote dilution, or perhaps even as a signal to
lower courts about the declining importance of the preconditions.
116 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reautho‐
rization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub L No 109‐246 § 5, 120 Stat 577, 580, codified at 42
USCA § 1973(b) (2007). See also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting
Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174, 207–08 (2007) (noting that one of the two major changes instituted
by the Act was to overturn Georgia v Ashcroft by requiring “denials of preclearance when voting
laws ‘diminish[] the ability’ of minorities ‘to elect their preferred candidate of choice’”).
117 See Pender County v Bartlett, 649 SE2d 364 (NC 2007), cert granted sub nom Bartlett v.
Strickland, 128 S Ct 1648 (2008) (calendared for October Term 2008). The question presented in
the case is “Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed district’s
population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.” See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Bartlett v Strickland, No 07‐689, *i (filed Nov 21, 2007), available on West‐
law at 2007 WL 4207130. There is currently some ambiguity about whether prong 1 creates such
an obligation. See, for example, Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1556–63 (cited in note 40) (summarizing
the disagreement).
118 This reification may be of considerable concern to the Court, as it has often emphasized
that minority vote dilution jurisprudence was designed in part as a transitional regime rather than
as a system that creates permanently safe sinecures for minority voters. See, for example, De
Grandy, 512 US at 1020[FC at n 115.]:

[Block][F]or all the virtues of majority‐minority districts as remedial devices, they rely on . . .
the ‘politics of second best’ . . . . [S]ociety’s racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate
[such districts,] . . . but minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and
trade to find common political ground, the virtue of which is not to be slighted in applying a
statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in American politics.[Block, no indent]
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More generally, our findings inform debates about judicial inter‐
vention in cases concerning political rights. Whenever federal courts
intervene in the political process they inevitably face charges of im‐
proper entanglement in politics. (Bush v Gore is but one example of this
fact.119) For that reason, many scholars have documented the strong
pressure courts face in these cases to craft objective and relatively
clear tests for liability. This pressure is in part what led the Supreme
Court to adopt the bright‐line test of one person, one vote in the
1960s—a legal test for which, as John Hart Ely once remarked, “admin‐
istrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is what
else it has to recommend it.”120 And it is in part what has led the Court
to decline repeated invitations to police partisan gerrymandering. We
show that the Court’s efforts to provide such an objective test in Gingles
has turned out to be somewhat self‐defeating. What this means for the
future of minority voting rights jurisprudence is not entirely clear.
Courts may respond to the pressure by reshaping Section 2 doctrine to
be more rule‐like in practice. Or they may respond by scaling back their
intervention in the field. Our findings cannot predict the future direc‐
tion courts or Congress will take. But they do provide a rich account of
the institutional constraints that will shape any effort to design a legal
regime that protects minority political participation.

119 531 US 98, 103–11 (2000) (per curiam). See also David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v.
Gore, 94 Georgetown L J 1427, 1427–30 (2006) (summarizing the criticisms of the decision levied
in law journals and the mass media).
120 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 121 (Harvard 1980).
See also Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and
Its Progeny, 80 NC L Rev 1411, 1441 (2002) (“[B]right‐line rules may [ ] result in more widespread
judicial interference in the political process than broad theories because only the latter offer
grounds for discerning sensible limiting principles and making contextual judgments regarding
application of the equality norm.”).[EIO]
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